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Recent Developments in the 
Law ol Search and Seizure 
By Professor Jerold H. Israel* 
This article is designed to provide a survey of recent decisions 
dealing with several important issues in the area of search 
and seizure. It is intended primarily as a basic collection of 
sources. I have, therefore, sought to keep my own commentary 
at a minimum and the citations to relevant cases at a maximum. 
Wherever space permits, I have let the courts speak for themselves. 
In most instances, however, it has been necessary to provide fairly 
general descriptions of the cases. 
In using these materials, two limitations should be kept in 
mind. First, the collection of cases is not exhaustive. No attempt 
has been made to cite every case in every jurisdiction dealing 
with a particular point. I have concentrated on opinions that 
discuss the issues involved at some length. These opinions should 
provide an excellent starting point for further research. Second, 
the cases deal primarily with the federal constitutional aspects 
of the issues discussed. State constitutions, statutes, and judicial 
decisions may impose further limitations upon the authority of 
police officers to make searches and arrests. While the actions 
of state officers must meet federal constitutional restrictions [see 
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)], nothing in the Constitution 
prevents the states from imposing more severe restrictions of 
their own. 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
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I. What Areas Are Protected. 
A. Background. 
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." With a few exceptions, the 
applications of the amendment to sea:ches of the individual's 
"person" and his "papers" or personal "effects" is fairly clear. 
See1 e.g.1 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616 (1886); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th 
Cir., 1966). The difficulties arise in determining its application to 
various closed or partially closed structures and the area sur-
rounding these structures. Although the Constitution speaks in 
terms of searching "houses," that term is not defined in a technical 
narrow fashion. Consider, for example, Justice Stewart's comments 
in Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), considering a claim 
that electronic eavesdropping in a jail visiting room violated the 
Fourth Amendment: 1 
But to say that a public jail is the equivalent of a man's 
"house" or that it is a place where he can claim constitutional 
immunity from search or seizure of his person, his papers, or 
his effects, is at best a novel argument. To be sure, the 
Court has been far from niggardly in construing the physical 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection. A business office is 
a protected area, and so may be a store. A hotel room, in the 
eyes of the Fourth Amendment, may become a person's 
"house," and so, of course, may an apartment. An automobile 
may not be unreasonably searched. Neither may an occupied 
taxicab. Yet, without attempting either to define or to predict 
the ultimate scope of Fourth Amendment protection, it is 
obvious that a jail shares none of the attributes of privacy 
of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room. In 
I. The Court found it unnecessary to finally resolve this issue because 
petitioner's conviction could be based on charges that were unrelated to 
the eavesdropping. 
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prison, official surveillance has traditionally been the order 
of the day. Though it may be assumed that even in a jail, 
or perhaps especially there, the relationships which the law 
has endowed with particularized confidentiality must continue 
to receive unceasing protection, there is no claimed violation 
of any such special relationship here [Id. at 143-144]. 
Although Lanza emphasizes the nature of the area involved, a 
later decision by Justice Stewart warns against placing undue 
emphasis upon the categorization of a particular area as either 
totally protected or unprotected. In Katz v. United States, re-
printed in Chapter 3, the defendant Katz was convicted of trans-
mitting wagering information from Los Angeles to Miami. At trial, 
the government attempted to introduce evidence of the defendant's 
end of telephone conversations overheard by F.B.I. agents who 
had attached an electronic listening and recording device to 
the outside of the public telephone booth from which the 
defendant had placed his calls. The government argued that, 
even if electronic eavesdropping generally came within the 
Fourth Amendment, it would not do so here since a public 
telephone booth was not a constitutionally protected area. Justice 
Stewart, speaking for the Court, refused to discuss the issue in 
terms of the constitutional status of the telephone booth: 
We decline to accept this formulation of the issue .... In 
the first place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment 
problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the 
phrase "constitutionally protected area" . . .. 
. . . The parties have attached great significance to the 
characterization of the telephone booth from which the 
petitioner placed his calls . . . . 
But this effort to decide whether or not a given "area," 
viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects 
attention from the problem presented by this case. For the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. ·what a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection . . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, 
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even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected. . . . 
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth 
from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed 
partly of glass, so that he was visible after he entered it as he 
would have been if he had remained outside. But what he 
sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the 
intruding eye-it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his 
right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place 
where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a 
business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a 
person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection 
of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the 
door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place 
a call, is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters 
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world [389 
U.S. at 350-352]. 
Despite its criticism of undue reliance upon the characterization 
of areas as either "protected" or "unprotected," the Katz opinion 
does not appear to be rejecting this distinction as irrelevant. 
Rather, the Court would seem to be saying that the degree to 
which an area is protected may depend upon the nature of the 
invasion. Thus, the Fourth Amendment may not protect the 
individual in the telephone booth from secret observation, while 
it would protect him from electronic eavesdropping. The con-
tinued significance of the particular area involved is emphasized 
in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion: 
I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold 
only ... that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, 
like a house . . . and unlike a field . . . , a person has a 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy 
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places." The question, however, is what 
protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the 
answer to that question requires reference to a "place." My 
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understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior 
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society 
is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's home 
is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but 
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain 
view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention · 
to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other 
hand, conversations in the open would not be protected 
against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy 
under the circumstances would be unreasonable .... 
The critical fact in this case is that "[o]ne who occupies 
it, [a telephone booth] shuts the door behind him, and pays 
the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to 
assume" that his conversation is not being intercepted. Ante, 
p. 352. The point is not that the booth is "accessible to the 
public" at other times, ante, p. 351, but that it is a temporarily 
private place whose momentary occupants' expectations of 
freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable [389 
U.S. at 360-61]. 
Of course, it should be emphasized that even if an area is 
viewed as protected, that does not mean it is immune from search, 
but only that any search is subject to the Fourth Amendment 
limitations relating to probable cause and the issuance of a 
warrant. 
B. The Area Surrounding a Dwelling. 
Traditionally, Fourth Amendment protection extends only to 
such area surrounding a dwelling as comes within the common 
law concept of the curtilage. The curtilage is generally defined 
as the "dwelling area and that area immediately adjacent thereto," 
but its scope varies with the physical situation: 
\Vhether the place searched is within the curtilage is to be 
determined from the facts, including its proximity or annexa-
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tion to the dwelling, its inclusion within the general enclosure 
surrounding the dwelling, and its use and enjoyment as an 
adjunct to the domestic economy of the family [Care v. 
United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (lOth Cir., 1956)]. 
The Supreme Court early established that an open field some 
distance from a household is not within the curtilage. In Hester 
v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), federal agents were approach-
ing Hester's house when they saw Henderson, a prospective 
purchaser of moonshine, "drive near to the house." They con-
cealed themselves "from fifty to one hundred yards away anci 
saw Hester come out and hand Henderson a bottle." When the 
officers then showed themselves Hester threw away a jug and ran; 
the officers retrieved the jug, a bottle (dropped by Henderson), 
and also a jar containing moonshine which had apparently been 
tossed out a window. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, 
rejected Hester's claim that the jug, bottle, and jar were obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Holmes noted that even 
if the officers had trespassed on Hester's land, the evidence "was 
not obtained by an illegal search or seizure." 
It is enough to say that, ap~rt from the justification, the 
special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the 
people in their "persons, houses, papers and effects" is not 
extended to the open fields. The distinction between the 
latter and the house is as old as the common law [265 U.S. 
57, 58-59 (1924)]. 
Although Hester may ha\'e settled the status of the open field, 
determining the status of such structures as garages (attached 
and unattached), barns, and chicken houses has proved more 
troublesome. ComjJare, e.g., PeojJle v. Oaks, 251 Mich. 253, 231 
N.W. 557 (1930) and Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281 (5th 
Cir., 1955) with Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (lOth Cir., 
1956) and Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447 (5th Cir., 1955). 
See also Taylor v. U.S., 286 U.S. 1 ( 1932) and United States v. 
Potts, 297 F.2d 68 (6th Cir., 1961). 
Recent cases generally have followed the past trend, holding, 
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e.g., an open field over half a mile from the house, outside the 
curtilage, and, a garage "located close to rear of the house and 
fifty to seventy-five feet from the street," within the curtilage. 
See McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599 (8th Cir., 1967); 
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 233 N.E.2d 5 (Mass., 1968). Two 
cases, however, moving in opposite directions, have suggested 
that the common law concept of the curtilage should no longer 
be controlling: 
(1) People v. Alexander, 61 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Cal. Ct. App., 
1967). The Court here admitted into evidence three tin cans 
of marijuana concealed in the chimney of a barbecue located 
in the defendant's back yard. The barbecue was described as 
"within [the] yard, but detached from any structure ... 5 or 6 
feet wide at the base, with a chimney rising 7 or 8 feet." 
The Court found that the search could not be upheld as 
incident to a lawful arrest "because there was no legal justification 
shown for arresting defendant until the marijuana was discovered 
in his back yard." Nevertheless, the search was sustained on the 
authority of Hester, supra, and several California cases in which 
an officer had either seized material lying in a yard or had been 
standing within the yard when observing defendant's actions 
within the household. (Compare Section II, infra). After describing 
these cases in detail, the Court stated: 
These cases teach that a search made upon the private 
property which surrounds a house is not necessarily an un-
reasonable one. We believe the Willard opinion correctly 
states the rationale of the earlier decisions when it says 
" ... the degree of privacy which defendant enjoyed in the 
place involved is an important factor in determining the 
reasonableness of the search; and that essentially the deter-
mination of its reasonableness must depend upon the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case." 
It is defendant's contention that the entire curtilage, the 
area immediately surrounding the house and habitually used 
for family purposes, is constitutionally protected against the 
intrusion of police officers. But that theory cannot be recon-
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ciled with the holdings of the six California appellate 
decisions cited above. In each of those cases the officer came 
into the curtilage to find the evidence. Although those de-
cisions preclude the adoption of defendant's theory, none of 
them can be said to reach the precise question presented here. 
Assuming it is lawful for an officer to enter the back yard to 
look through windows or examine the garage or packages left 
in the bushes, does he cross the constitutional threshold 
when he thrusts his arm into the chimney of the back yard 
barbecue? 
We begin by observing that, as a proposition of almost 
universal truth, honest people have no need for privacy in 
such chimneys. Although a barbecue chimney is a part of 
residential (as distinguished from business) land use, it is 
not the kind of place where privacy is usually thought to be 
important. No one would ever think of storing anything in 
such a place unless he was hiding contraband of some sort. 
If it is permissible for the police to enter and inspect a 
residential back yard at all (and the decisions say it is), the 
honest householder suffers no additional inconvenience or 
indignity when the officer thrusts his arm into the soot of the 
barbecue. A rule which would draw the line there would 
not protect the privacy of the person, his home, office, papers 
or effects. It would aid only those who need convenient 
storage for contraband. 
The search of a barbecue chimney is by no means as sig-
nificant an invasion of the privacy of the home as is going 
upon the porch to peer through the blinds, or walking around 
the house to find an undraped window. By the standard 
developed in these cases, we cannot say that the search here 
was so unreasonable as to require the exclusion of the 
marijuana [61 Cal. Rptr. 819]. 
(2) Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir., 1968). 
The Court here ruled inadmissible evidence obtained from the 
search of a stock pile of trees located on the grounds of a motel 
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in which both defendants resided. One defendant, Wattenburg, 
also operated the motel. The search had been conducted by the 
Forest Service pursuant to an invalid warrant and there had been 
no consent. The Government argued, however, that the search 
could still be upheld because "it was not made in or about 
defendants' 'house,' but in an open field." The Court rejected 
this argument on the following grounds: 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people 
to be secure in their "persons, houses, papers, and effects . 
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." Pointing 
to this language, Justice Holmes said for the Supreme Court, 
in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 
898, that the special protection afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment "is not extended to the open fields." Justice 
Holmes added: "The distinction between the latter and the 
house is as old as the common law. 4 BL. CoMM. 223, 225, 
226." (265 U.S. at 59, 44 S.Ct. at 446). 
Ever since this Supreme Court pronouncement in Hester, 
the "open field" doctrine has. been uniformly recognized and 
applied where, under the facts of a particular case, it was held 
that the search and seizure had occurred in an open field. 
The kinds of warrantless searches which have been upheld 
under the "open field" doctrine are well illustrated in the 
cases which the Government calls to our attention. In Hester, 
supra, the enforcement officers obtained their information 
that a crime was being committed by concealing themselves 
at a point from fifty to a hundred yards from the defendant's 
residence. In United States v. Hassell, 6 Cir., 336 F.2d 684, 
685, the search for a still was made about 250 yards from the 
defendant's house. In Care v. United States, 10 Cir., 231 F.2d 
22, 24-25, the search was made in a plum thicket approxi-
mately half a mile away from defendant's residence, and in a 
cave in a plowed field across a road and more than a long city 
block from the home. In Janney v. United States, 4 Cir., 206 
F.2d 601, 602, an enforcement officer obtained the informa-
tion that a crime was being committed by concealing himself 
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beside a hog pen on the other side of a wire fence which was 
about one hundred feet west of the house. 
The undisputed evidence in the case before us establishes 
circumstances differing radically from those present in the 
foregoing cases. As a Government witness testified, the stock-
pile of Christmas trees was on the premises known as Hide-
away Lodge, the pile being among some standing trees. He 
further testified the distance between the stockpile and the 
lodge was from twenty to thirty-five feet, and that the 
stockpile was about five feet from a parking area used by 
personnel and patrons of the lodge. This witness characterized 
the position of the stockpile as "immediately behind" and 
"immediately adjacent" to the lodge. The trial court com-
mented that the trees were "in Mr. Wattenburg's back yard." 
As stated above, Wattenburg operated and lived at the 
Hideaway Lodge, and Owens rented a room there which he 
sometimes occupied. 
The protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment, inso-
far as houses are concerned, has never been restricted to the 
interior of the house, but has extended to open areas im-
mediately adjacent thereto. The differentiation between an 
immediately adjacent protected area and an unprotected 
open field has usually been analyzed as a problem of deter-
mining the extent of the "curtilage." 
Applying here this means of differentiating between a 
protected area immediately adjacent to a house, and an open 
field unprotected by the Fourth Amendment, we have no 
hesitancy in holding that the stockpile of Christmas trees here 
in question was within the curtilage of Wattenburg's abode at 
the Hideaway Lodge, and therefore, at least as to him, pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. 
\Ve wish to add, however, that it seems to us, a more 
appropriate test in determining if a search and seizure 
adjacent to a house is constitutionally forbidden is whether 
it constitutes an intrusion upon what the resident seeks to 
preserve as private even in an area which, although adjacent 
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to his home, is accessible to the public. See Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 237, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, decided 
December 18, 1967. As the Supreme Court said in Katz, "the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." 
The "curtilage" test is predicated upon a common law 
concept which has no historical relevancy to the Fourth 
Amendment guaranty.2 In ]ones v. United States, 362 U.S. 
257, 266, the Supreme Court warned, in connection with 
another search and seizure problem, that: 
[I]t is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law 
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, de-
veloped and refined by the common law in evolving the 
body of private property law .... 
2. Evidencing a disposition to expand previously held views as to what is 
entitled to protection under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court 
in Camara, decided on June 5, 1967, invalidated a warrantless administra-
tive inspection of a residence and, in doing so, expressly overruled Frank 
v. State of Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S.Ct. 804, 3 L.Ed.2d 877, decided 
only eight years previously. And in the companion case of See v. City of 
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943, a warrantless admin-
istrative inspection of a commercial warehouse was held illegal although 
it did not involve a search of individuals, a house, papers or effects. The 
Court said: 
The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional 
right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries 
upoi_I his private commercial property. 387 U.S. at 543, 87 S.Ct. at 
1739. 
In Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed. 2d 574, 
the Fourth Amendment was held to protect individuals from having their 
telephone conversations within a public telephone booth overheard by 
Government enforcement officers by means of electronic listening and 
recording devices attached to the outside of the booth. 
The considerations of privacy here envisioned are not predicated upon 
a general constitutional 'right of privacy,' but upon a right to be free 
from certain kinds of governmental intrusion. See Katz v. United States, 
supra. It should also be noted, as the Supreme Court said in Katz, that 
the reach of the Fourth Amendment is not limited to the protection of 
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion 'but 
its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy 
at all.' [Footnote by the Court] 
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If the determination of such questions is made to turn 
upon the degree of privacy a resident is seeking to preserve 
as shown by the facts of the particular case, rather than upon 
a resort to the ancient concept of curtilage, attention will be 
more effectively focused on the basic interest which the 
Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. As the Supreme 
Court recently said in Camara v. Municipal Court of City 
and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 
1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930: 
The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in 
countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the 
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary in-
vasions by governmental officials. 
Measured by the test we suggest, Wattenburg was, without 
doubt, protected by the Fourth Amendment from a warrant-
less search and seizure of the kind described above. In the 
daytime and in the dark, from 2:35 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on 
November 8, 1965, several law enforcement officials meticu-
lously went through the stockpile of trees located in the 
back yard of his abode and no more than thirty-five feet from 
the building. It must have been necessary to move most of the 
trees from one place to another in order to make the kind of 
examination which the officers carried on. Lights must have 
been required as the men moved about after dark and there 
was undoubtedly a certain amount of noise. There can be no 
doubt that Wattenburg, in placing the stockpile this close 
to his place of residence, sought to protect it from this kind 
of governmental intrusion. 
The search and seizure was therefore illegal as to Watten-
burg. [388 F.2d 856-859] 
C. Places Used for Limited and Transient Purposes-E.g., 
Telephone Booths, Toilets, Lockers and Desks. 
The Katz decision, quoted supra, Section I(A), clearly estab-
lishes that places occupied by individuals for rather limited and 
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transient purposes may be protected by the Fourth Amendment 
under certain circumstances. As Justice Harlan noted, the area 
must be one in which the individual has exhibited an actual 
expectation of privacy and the expectation must be "one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable" 389 U.S. at 361. 
Katz held that a person in a telephone booth is protected against 
eavesdropping, but not necessarily against observation. Recent de-
cisions have held that a public toilet booth is protected against 
secret observation. See e.g., Brown v. State, 238 A.2d 147 (Md.Ct. 
App., 1968) and Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir., 
1965). 
The California courts, however, apparently draw a distinction 
between 4-walled public toilets (protected) and the three walled 
(doorless) toilets (unprotected). Compare Bielicki v. Superior 
Court, 371 P.2d 288 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 1962) and People v. Young, 
29 Cal. Rptr. 492 (Ct. App., 1963). 
The application of the Fourth Amendment to areas such as 
lockers and desks is often complicated by the limited nature of 
the defendant's interest in that property. In an earlier case, 
United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir., 1951), the court 
found unreasonable the police search of a desk assigned for 
defendant's exclusive use in the federal government office where 
she was employed. The search was made with the consent of 
defendant's supervisor and was based on the assertion of a 
fellow employee that the defendant stole her purse. The Govern-
ment contended that the defendant had an insufficient interest 
to object to the search in light of her superior's consent. In 
rejecting this argument, the Circuit Court made the following 
comment on the application of the Fourth Amendment to the 
search of the desk: 
We think appellee's exclusive right to use the desk assigned 
to her made the search of it unreasonable. No doubt a search 
of it without her consent would have been reasonable if made 
by some people in some circumstances. Her official superiors 
might reasonably have searched the desk for official property 
needed for official use. But as the Municipal Court of Appeals 
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said, the search that was made was not "an inspection or 
search by her superiors. It was precisely the kind of search 
by policemen for evidence of crime against which the con-
stitutional prohibition was directed." In the absence of a valid 
regulation to the contrary, appellee was entitled to, and did, 
keep private property of a personal sort in her desk. Her 
superiors could not reasonably search the desk for her 
purse, her personal letters, or anything else that did not 
belong to the Government and had no connection with the 
work of the office. Their consent did not make such a search 
by the police reasonable. Operation of a government agency 
and enforcement of a criminal law do not amalgamate to give 
a right of search beyond the scope of either [188 F.2d at 1021]. 
Two recent cases distinguish Blok on rather interesting grounds: 
(I) United States v. Donato, 269 F.Supp. 921 (E.D.Pa., 1967). In 
this case mint security guards conducted a search of all employee 
lockers looking for firecrackers. Defendant's locker contained a 
bag of newly minted quarters and he was subsequently prosecuted 
for embezzlement. Defendant's objection to the search was 
rejected on the following grounds: 
The locker in which the coins were found was the property 
of the United States Government. It had been assigned to 
defendant for his exclusive use subject to a valid Government 
regulation which provides: "No mint lockers in mint institu-
tions shall be considered private lockers." All employee 
lockers were subject to inspection and were regularly inspected 
by the Mint security guards for sanitation purposes. The 
Mint security guards had a master key which opened all the 
employee lockers. It makes no difference that there was no 
specific evidence that defendant had personal knowledge of 
the above regulations of the master key, because he could 
have acquired no greater right of privacy in the Government 
owned locker than he was given by the Government. The 
instant case is analagous to United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 
652 (4th Cir., 1964) where a search without a warrant was 
upheld because a military regulation permitted such a search 
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on authorization of a commanding officer. In so ruling, the 
Court considered the importance to the military of main-
taining order and discipline .... In the present case there 
is a government regulation which permits the Mint security 
guards to inspect any and all Mint employee lockers when-
ever necessary. (The existence of this regulation distinguishes 
the present case from United States v. Blok ... )_ [269 F. 
Supp. at 923-24]. 
(2) People v. Overton, 229 N.E.2d 596 (N.Y. Ct. App., 1967). In 
this case the court sustained the search of a high school student's 
locker. The search was conducted by three detectives who possessed 
an invalid search warrant. However, the vice-principal, on seeing 
the warrant, consented to the search. The court distinguished 
Blok on the following grounds: 
It is axiomatic that the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment is not restricted to dwellings . . . . A depository such 
as a locker or even a desk is safeguarded from unreasonable 
searches for evidence of a crime. United States v. Blok .... 
There are situations, however, where someone other than 
the defendant in possession of a depository may consent to 
what otherwise would have been an illegal search. . . . 
The power of [the vice-principal] ... to give his consent 
to the search arises out of the distinct relationship between 
school authorities and students. 
The school authorities have an obligation to maintain . 
discipline over the students. It is recognized that, when large 
numbers of teenagers are gathered together in such an 
environment, their inexperience and lack of mature judg-
ment can often create hazards to each other. Parents, who 
surrender their children to this type of environment, in 
order that they may continue developing both intellectually 
and socially, have a right to expect certain safeguards. 
It is in the high school years particularly that parents are 
justifiably concerned that their children not become accus-
tomed to antisocial behavior, such as the use of illegal drugs. 
The susceptibility to suggestion of students of high school age 
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increases the danger. Thus, it is the affirmative obligation of 
the school authorities to investigate any charge that a student 
is using or possessing narcotics and to take appropriate steps, 
if the charge is substantiated. 
When Overton was assigned his locker, he, like all the other 
students at Mount Vernon High School, gave the combination 
to his home room teacher who, in turn, returned it to an 
office where it was kept on file. The students at Mount 
Vernon are well aware that the school authorities possess 
the combinations of their lockers. It appears understood that 
the lock and the combination are provided in order that 
each student may have exclusive possession of the locker 
vis-a-vis other students, but the student does not have· such 
exclusivity over the locker as against the school authorities. 
In fact, the school issues regulations regarding what may and 
may not be kept in the lockers and presumably can spot 
check to insure compliance. The vice-principal testified that 
he had, on occasion, inspected the lockers of students. 
Indeed, it is doubtful if a school would be properly 
discharging its duty of supervision over the students, if it 
failed to retain control over the lockers. Not only have the 
school authorities a right to inspect but this right becomes a 
duty when suspicion arises that something of an illegal nature 
may be secreted there. 'When the vice-principal learned of 
the detectives' suspicion, he was obligated to inspect the 
locker. This interest, together with the nonexclusive nature 
of the locker, empowered him to consent to the search by 
the officers [229 N .E. 2d at 597]. 
A recent Supreme Court decision indicates that Blok, Donato, 
and Overton would be viewed as quite different cases if the 
employer or principal had not consented to the search. In 
Mancusi v. DeForte, 36 U.S.L.W. 4682, the Court held invalid 
a search (without a warrant) of various records taken from 
a union office shared by several employees. The Court's primary 
concern in the case related to the standing of one of the 
employees to object to the search. Since his employer, the union, 
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had not consented to the search, there was no question but that 
state officials conducting the search had invaded a "protected area." 
The only issue was whether the defendant had a sufficient 
interest in that area to complain of the search. The Court held 
that he did. Justice White, dissenting, suggested that the em-
ployee's interest extended only to his desk. It is not clear, 
however, whether he or the majority would uphold this interest 
even where the employer consented to the search. 
II. What Constitutes a Search-The Limitations of the 
Plain View Doctrine. 
A. Background. 
Contrary to an earlier position, courts now generally recognize 
that "mere observation" without physical entry onto protected 
premises may amount to a "search." See) e.g.) Bielicki v. Superior 
Court, 371 P.2d 288 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 1962); Smayda v. United States, 
352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir., 1965); cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 
U.S. 451 ( 1948). This point is reinforced by the decision in Katz, 
supra Section I(A), holding that eavesdropping without physical 
entry constitutes a search. 
The "observational search" is brought into issue in various 
contexts. Quite frequently the actual seizure of contraband follows 
immediately upon the observation of the evidence through a 
window in a home or car. If the observation is invalid, then the 
subsequent seizure is also invalid. Sometimes the observation will 
furnish the basis for an arrest which then leads to a search. 
Again, if the observation is unconstitutional, then both the arrest 
and subsequent search fail. Similarly, unconstitutional observation 
cannot be used as the basis for obtaining a search warrant. Thus 
the validity of the officer's initial observation is often the key 
issue in search and seizure cases. Of course, if the observation 
does constitute a "search," then it is subject to the usual Fourth 
Amendment requirements regarding probable cause and the use 
of a warrant. It is quite clear, however, that not all observations 
constitute "searches" for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
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B. The Plain View Doctrine. 
It is frequently stated that the observation of persons or 
property in "plain view" does not constitute a search. See Boyd 
v. United States, 286 Fed. 930, 931 (4th Cir., 1923); Petteway v. 
United States, 261 F.2d, 53, 54 (4th Cir., 1958). See United States 
v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927). As one court has said, "a search 
implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed, 
and it is not a search to observe that which is open to view." 
People v. Marvin, 193 N.E. 202 (Ill. Sup. Ct., 1934). The plain 
view doctrine clearly applies in the situation in which officers 
standing upon public property view contraband or illegal activity 
through a car window. See Boyd v. U.S. 1 supra; Nunex v. United 
States, 370 F.2d 538 (5th Cir., 1967); Sneed v. State, 423 S.W.2d 
857 (Tenn., 1968). The doctrine has also been applied where an 
officer spots contraband in the course of making a normal entry 
into a home or business. Thus, where an officer sees narcotics 
equipment through an open door, having called on the defendant 
to discuss a possible parole violation, the initial observation will 
not be viewed as a search and the subsequent arrest will be 
sustained. See, e.g., People v. Gonzales, 57 Cal. Rptr. 534 (Ct. 
App., 1967). Officers in the premises on legitimate business are 
not "guilty of any impropriety in allowing their eyes to wander." 
Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476, 478 (D.C. Cir., 1953). 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the application of the 
"open view" doctrine to this context in Harris v. U.S., 36 U.S. L. 
W. 4195 (U.S., March 5, 1968). In that case the petitioner had 
been arrested on a charge of robbery, and his car, which had 
been seen leaving the site of the robbery, was impounded. After 
a cursory search, the car was towed to the precinct station. Local 
police regulations required that the impounded vehicle be 
searched thoroughly, all valuables removed from it and a property 
tag attached to it. The arresting officer, pursuant to the regulation, 
entered the vehicle and tied a property tag on the steering wheel. 
As he was closing the open windows, he saw a registration card 
which lay "face up" on the metal stripping over which the door 
closed. The card belonged to the robbery victim. The officer 
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then took the car back to the precinct station where he con-
fronted the defendant with the card. When the defendant dis-
claimed all knowledge of the card, the officer removed it from 
the car. He later returned to the car, searched the trunk, rolled 
up the windows and locked the door. The Court upheld the 
admissibility of the seized registration card on the following 
grounds: 
The sole question for our consideration is whether the 
officer discovered the registration card by means of an illegal 
search. We hold that he did not. The admissibility of evidence 
found as a result of a search under the police regulation is not 
presented by this case. The precise and detailed findings of 
the District Court, accepted by the Court of Appeals, were 
to the effect that the discovery of the card was not the result 
of a search of the car, but of a measure taken to protect the 
car while it was in police custody. Nothing in the Fourth 
Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant in these 
narrow circumstances. 
Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration 
card, with the name of the robbery victim on it, was plainly 
visible. It has long been settled that objects falling in the 
plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position 
to have that view are subject to seizure and may be intro-
duced in evidence. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 
(1963); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); Hester v. 
United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) [36 U.S.L.W. at 4196]. 
Cf.) Co Hon v. U.S., 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir., 1967); State v. 
Raman, 432 P.2d 507 (Ore. Sup. Ct., 1967); U.S. v. Grodian, 391 
F.2d 439 (6th Cir., 1968)]. 
A similar approach was taken by the Court last term in Lewis 
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1967). The Court there upheld 
the admissibility of evidence received by a police undercover 
agent in the defendant's home. The agent, by misrepresenting 
his identity, had been invited to the home to purchase narcotics. 
Defendant claimed that the agent's entry and observations within 
the home violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected 
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this claim, noting that the home had been used as a business, 
and the agent had been invited there by the defendant. While 
on the premises, the officer certainly could observe what occurred 
within the household. The Court warned, however, that "this 
does not mean that, whenever entry is obtained by invitation 
and the locus is characterized as a place of business, an agent 
is authorized to conduct a general search for incriminating 
materials." 385 U.S. at 211. 
C. Observation Through the Windows of Residences. 
While recent cases continue to accept the application of the 
plain view doctrine where the officer views items in the normal 
course of making a legitimate entry into the household, con-
siderable doubt has been raised concerning the practice of peering 
through windows. Older cases have accepted this practice even 
when (a) the observations were made from within the curtilage 
and (b) the officers apparently came upon the property with 
observation as a prime objective. See People v. Martin, 290 P.2d 
855 (Cal. 1955); Polk v. United States, 314 F.2d 837 (9th 
Cir., 1963). See also the cases cited in People v. Alexander, 
61 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Ct. App., 1967). More recent cases have 
accepted secret observation where the observer was some distance 
from the house or on the property of another. See Johnson v. 
State, 234 A.2d 464 (Md., 1967) (use of binoculars in looking 
through unobstructed window of house 150 feet away did not 
constitute search and did not taint search warrant based on 
those observations.) U.S. v. Campbell, 275 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ct., S.C., 
1967) (observation of defendant's activities on a porch from a 
cornfield 50 feet from the house not subject to Fourth Amend-
ment even though officers were trespassers.) However, observation 
from within the curtilage has been treated as a search, subject 
to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See Texas v. 
Gonzales, 388 F.2d 145 (5th Cir., 1968); Gonzales v. Beto, 266 
F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Tex., 1967); United States v. Calabro, 276 
F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y., 1967). But see People v. Hailstock, 283 
N.Y.S.2d 492 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct., 1967). 
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In light of Katz, supra, the courts' emphasis on whether the 
observation took place from within the curtilage may no longer be 
appropriate. Rather, the crucial issue may be whether the 
defendant could reasonably have anticipated that his activities 
would be observed through the window by other persons in the 
normal pursuit of their daily activities. This approach is suggested 
in part by Texas v. Gonzales, supra. There four police officers, 
located in the next house, established an evening surveillance of 
a house in which defendant was a guest. Their purpose was to 
ascertain if narcotics were being peddled and they intended to 
raid the house if their suspicions in this regard were confirmed. 
Before the raid was made, one of the officers made three trips 
across the yard to peer through side windows. The officer peered 
through three separate windows, at one point standing on a 
drainpipe to gain a better vantage point. On the third trip, he 
saw three men seated around a table with knives in their hands 
working with white powder on a plate. At this point, the house 
was raided and defendant arrested. The Court held that the 
observations through the window were themselves invalid and 
therefore could not establish probable cause. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court stated: 
In determining whether the search is reasonable, courts 
must strike a balance between this right to privacy and the 
Government's need to secure evidence of guilt. Numerous 
courts have solved the problem of searching residences and 
outlying buildings by resort to the common-law concept of 
the "curtilage." ... Apparently this concept helps set the 
Fourth Amendment boundaries which the police cannot in-
vade without probable cause. The district court held that the 
officer's conduct in trespassing on the property and peering 
in the window amounted to an invasion of the curtilage 
without probable cause to arrest or search. A more relevant 
issue also considered by the district court enables this Court 
to avoid the fictional question of where the curtilage begins 
and ends. 
The paramount reason for affirmance in this case is that 
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the conduct of Officer Gann constituted an illegal search 
because his three trips to the window were made at a time 
when he lacked probable cause to think that narcotics were 
possessed in the home. The State's objection to this con-
clusion is that since the eye cannot commit the trespass 
condemned by the Fourth Amendment, Gann's observations 
cannot constitute a search. This contention is foreclosed by 
Brock v. United States, 5th Cir. 1955, 223 F.2d 681. There 
we held that standing on a man's premises and peering in his 
window constituted a search and in that case violated his 
"right to be let alone" as guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Id. at 685. See Davis v. United States, 9th Cir. 1964, 
327 F.2d 301; People of State of California v. Hurst, 9th Cir. 
1963, 325 F.2d 891; United States v. Lewis, S.D.N.Y.l964, 
227 F.Supp. 433. These decisions conform to the purposes of 
the right of privacy and correspond to the g!'OWth of that 
right. The landmark decision of Boyd v. United States, 1886, 
116 U.S. 616, first articulated the doctrine that the essence of 
the Fourth Amendment was protection against arbitrary 
intrusions into the privacies of life. The Supreme Court 
recently reaffirmed this principle in Warden) Maryland 
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 1967, 387 U.S. 294, and went on to 
note that the Court has to an increasing extent discarded 
fictional property concepts in resolving the issues of privacy 
and public security. See Barret, Personal Rights) Property 
Rights) and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SuPREME CouRT 
REv. 46; Comment, The Mere Evidence Rule: Doctrine or 
Dogma?, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 526, 554 (1967). Thus the exist-
ence of a search does not depend on a trespass under local 
property law. See Hayden, supra, 87 S.Ct. at 1648. All that is 
necessary is an "actual intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area." Katz v. United States, 1967, 389 U.S. 347, 
Berger v. State of New York, 1967, 388 U.S. 41, Brock teaches 
that this "actual intrusion" can be accomplished visually; 
however, Brock does not hold that officers cannot accomplish 
their search by looking in windows, but only that they must 
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have probable cause to think that a crime is being or has 
been committed before they do so. In this case, the police 
did not have probable cause to believe that narcotics were 
present in the Selvera home [388 F.2d at 147-148]. 
D. Observation Through Vents and Other Openings. 
Anticipating Katz, several recent cases have held that ob-
servation through holes in the wall, vents, and similar openings 
is clearly invalid irrespective of whether the observer is a 
trespasser. See) e.g.J State v. Kent, 432 P.2d 64 (Sup. Ct. of 
Utah, 1968); Brown v. State, 238 A.2d 147 (Md. App., 1968). 
This is contrary to a position previously taken by other courts, 
most notably the California Court of Appeals. See) e.g.J People 
v. Ruiz, 304 P.2d 175 (Cal. Ct. App., 1956); People v. Regalado, 14 
Cal. Rptr. 217 (1961). But see Bielicki v. Superior Court, 371 P.2d 
288 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 1962). Typical of the more recent decisions is 
State v. Kent, supra. In that case, a police officer obtained 
permission from the manager of a motel to use a hidden vantage 
point from which he could secretly observe the defendant, who 
was living in one of the motel units. The officer was placed in 
a position in the attic where, by looking through a ventilator, 
he could observe the entire bathroom and part of the bedroom 
of defendant's unit. On the second day of surveillance, the 
officer saw defendant prepare a "fix." He then radioed fellow 
officers who entered the unit, arrested the defendant, and seized 
the narcotics. The state argued that the arrest was justified by 
the observation and the observation was not subject to Fourth 
Amendment limits because there was no trespass. It maintained 
that "from the area occupied by [the officer], observation into 
the unit occupied was readily available to anyone. The officer 
did not have to take any affirmative action, such as removing a 
cover from the vent, but merely observed all that was open to 
observation." It further argued that "it was possible for someone 
in the bathroom to readily ascertain that he was being observed." 
432 P.2d at 65. The Court found these factors irrelevant: 
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We feel Officer Patrick's bathroom observations constituted 
an unlawful invasion of defendant's privacy. We are of the 
opinion the defendant, in renting the motel unit, obtained 
the exclusive right to use it, which included the right to 
privacy. It is true this right may be forfeited by illegal use 
of the property, but such unlawful utilization must first be 
established by legal means .... The defendant had the right 
to maintain his place of abode, though it was a room in a 
motel, as an annulus, free from outside intrusion and observa-
tion; a place inviolate where he could repose in security. 
It is true there is a difference between a casual or 
accidental observation and an intentional invasion of 
property. Intrusion upon private property may constitute 
trespass, yet not infrequently the gravamen of the harm is 
the injury to privacy. There is harm in being seen in privacy 
under unfavorable circumstances. 
It is impossible for us to determine whether Officer Lindsey 
or either of the other officers had sufficient evidence to link 
the defendant to a series of burglaries. If this were actually 
the case, then this officer should have secured a search warrant 
or a warrant for arrest of the defendant based upon the 
information he had received [432 P. 2d 464]. 
Ill. What Constitutes a Search-Searches Not Designed 
To Uncover Criminal Evidence. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has twice held that · dif-
ferent official intrusions upon privacy not directed at obtaining 
criminal evidence constitute "searches" for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, but are not subject to the same probable cause standards 
as the ordinary search in criminal cases: 
(I) In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the 
defendant was charged with a criminal offense of reft;sing to 
permit a warrantless inspection of his residence by a housing 
inspector. The building manager had informed the inspector 
that the defendant, a lessee, was using the rear of his leasehold as 
a personal residence in violation of the city's housing code. 
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The inspector returned on several occasions, and the defendant 
refused the inspector access to his apartment without a search 
warrant. Prosecution was begun and the defendant sought a 
writ of prohibition to the state oiminal court on the ground 
that the ordinance authorizing warrantless inspections was un-
constitutional. The state courts denied the writ on the basis of 
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). Overruling its decision 
in Frank, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court rejected the 
notion, expressed in Frank, that the Fourth Amendment interests 
at stake in inspection cases are merely "peripheral." The Court 
concluded that, except for emergency situations, the Constitution 
demanded that the inspector, if turned away by the occupant 
of the premises, obtain a warrant. But the Court went on 
to suggest that the probable cause needed to justify issuance of 
a warrant need not meet the same standards applicable to a 
criminal investigation: 
Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, 
the inspection programs at issue here are aimed at securing 
city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for 
private property. The primary governmental interest at stake 
is to prevent even the unintentional development of con-
ditions which are hazardous to public health and safety. 
Because fires and epidemics may ravage large urban areas, 
because unsightly conditions adversely affect the economic 
values of neighboring structures, numerous courts have up-
held the police power of municipalities to impose and enforce 
such minimum standards even upon existing structures. In 
determining whether a particular inspection is reasonable-
and thus in determining whether there is probable cause 
to issue a warrant for that inspection-the need for the 
inspection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals 
of code enforcement. 
There is unanimous agreement among those most familiar 
with this field that the only effective way to seek universal 
compliance with the minimum standards required by munici-
pal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all 
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structures. It is here that the probable cause debate is 
focused, for the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection 
is unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in the 
area as a whole, not on its knowledge of conditions in each 
particular building . 
. . . [W]e think that a number of persuasive factors combine 
to support the reasonableness of code enforcement area 
inspections. First, such programs have a long history of 
judicial and public acceptance. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 
U.S., at 367-371. Second, the public interest demands that all 
dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is 
doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve 
acceptable results. Many such conditions-faulty wiring is an 
obvious example-are not observable from outside the build-
ing and indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant 
himself. Finally, because the inspections are neither personal 
in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, 
they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban 
citizen's privacy .... 
Having concluded that the area inspection is a "reasonable" 
search of private property within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, it is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a 
warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or 
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection 
are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such 
standards, which will vary with the municipal program 
being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the 
nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), 
or the condition of the entire area, but they will not neces-
sarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of 
the particular dwelling. It has been suggested that so to vary 
the probable-cause test from the standard applied in criminal 
cases would be to authorize a "synthetic search warrant" and 
thereby to lessen the overall protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S., at 373. But we 
do not agree. The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee 
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that a decision to search private property is justified by a 
reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still 
the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the 
intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue 
a suitably restricted search warrant. Cf. Oklahoma Press 
Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186. Such an approach neither 
endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal in-
vestigations nor makes a nullity of the probable-cause re-
quirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to 
the competing public and private interests here at stake and, 
in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind the 
constitutionai·right to be free from unreasonable government 
invasions of privacy [387 U.S. at 535-39]. 
In See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, the Court held that the general 
principles announced in Camara also were applicable to inspec-
tion of commercial structures not used as private dwellings. The 
Court acknowledged that business premises might be inspected 
in many more situations than private homes, but concluded that 
the warraqt procedure was equally applicable to both. 
(2) In Terry v. Ohio, reprinted supra Chapter 1, the Court held 
that a "pat down for weapons" (i.e., a frisk) constitutes a "search" 
within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. The Court spe-
cifically rejected the notion "that the Fourth Amendment does 
not come into play at all . . . if the officers stop short of some-
thing called a 'technical arrest' or a 'full blown search.' " It 
noted that "it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English 
language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces 
of the body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search.' " The 
Court rejected, however, petitioner's argument that such a 
"search" should be judged by the same probable cause standards 
as a search incident to an arrest. Instead, it established a separate 
standard relating to the special objective of the frisk: 
There are two weaknesses in [petitioner's] line of reas-
oning, however. First, it fails to take account of traditional 
limitations upon the scope of searches, and thus recognizes 
no distinction in purpose, character, and extent between a 
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search incident to an arrest and a limited search for weapons. 
The former, although justified in part by the acknowledged 
necessity to protect the arresting officer from assault with a 
concealed weapon, Preston v. United States) 376 U.S. 364, 
367 (1964), is also justified on other grounds, ibid.) and can 
therefore involve a relatively extensive exploration of the 
person. A search for weapons in the absence of probable 
cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be 
strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its 
initiation. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (MR. 
JusTICE FoRTAS, concurring). Thus it must be limited to that 
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might 
be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realisti-
cally be characterized as something less than a "full" search, 
even though it remains a serious intrusion. 
A second, and related, objection to petitioner's argument 
is that it assumes that the law of arrest has already worked 
out the balance between the particular interests involved 
here-the neutralization of danger to the policeman in the 
investigative circumstance and the sanctity of the individual. 
But this is not so. An arrest is a wholly different kind of 
intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for 
weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are like-
wise quite different. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal 
prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in 
having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by 
future interference with the individual's freedom of move-
ment, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. 
The protective search for weapons, on the other hand, con-
stitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion 
upon the sanctity of the person. It does not follow that be-
cause an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he 
is apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a belief that the 
person has committed or is committing a crime, the officer is 
equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making 
any intrusions short of an arrest. Moreover, a perfectly reas-
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onable apprehension of danger may arise long before the 
officer is possessed of adequate information to justify taking 
a person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for 
a crime. Petitioner's reliance on cases which have worked out 
standards of reasonableness with regard to "seizures" con-
stituting arrests and searches incident thereto is thus mis-
placed. It assumes that the interests sought to be vindicated 
and the invasions of personal security may be equated in the 
two cases, and thereby ignores a vital aspect of the analysis 
of the reasonableness of particular types of conduct under 
the Fourth Amendment. See Camara v. Municipal Court) 
supra. 
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be 
struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there 
must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable 
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, 
where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an 
armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he 
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The 
officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual 
is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in 
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety or that of others was in danger. Cf. Beck v. Ohio) 379 
U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United States) 338 U.S. 160, 
174-176 (1949); Stacey v. Emery) 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878) 
[see Chapter I]. 
IV. Search by Consent. 
A. Background. 
Where effective consent is given, a search may be conducted 
without a warrant and without probable cause. Although there 
originally was some confusion as to the theoretical basis of the 
"consent doctrine," it is recognized today as being grounded on 
the concept of waiver. See) e.g.) Stoner v. California) 376 U.S. 
483 ( 1964 ). Accordingly, the rigid standards normally applicable 
to the waiver of constitutional rights are also applicable to the 
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proof of consent. As recently noted by the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, "consent to a search, in order to be voluntary, must 
be unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated 
by any duress or coercion, and is not lightly to be inferred . . . 
[Moreover,] the Government has the burden of proving that such 
consent has been given." See Rosenthall v. Henderson, 389 F.2d 
514 (6th Cir., 1968). Cf. johnson v. Zerbst) 304 U .. S. 458 (1938). 
Of course, the application of this standard must rest on a deter-
mination of the individual's state of mind including his aware-
ness of his rights, his interpretation of the police request, and his 
hesitancy, if any, in granting the request. Generally, the courts 
have determined the voluntariness of a consent on an ad hoc 
basis, carefully evaluating the facts of each case. See LaFave, 
Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law ... Has Not ... 
Run Smooth," 1966 ILL. LAw FoRUM 255, 313-317; Note 113 
U. PA. L. REv. 260 (analyzing the various factors cited by the 
courts in determining the validity of a consent). Several recent 
cases, however, seem to be moving in the direction of imposing 
certain factual prerequisites {or establishing a voluntary consent, 
similar to the pattern adopted in determining the voluntariness 
of confessions. 
B. The Requirement of a Miranda-Type Warning. 
The current decisions are divided as to the extension of the 
Miranda rationale to the search-consent area. Several courts have 
held that a warning that the individual need not submit to a 
search is not a prerequisite to establishing voluntary consent 
even where the person consenting was in police custody. See 
State v. Forney) 150 N.W.2d 915 (Neb. Sup. Ct., 1967); People v. 
Ford, 232 N.E.2d 684 (Ill. Sup. Ct., 1967); State v. Andrus, 199 
So.2d 867 (La. Sup. Ct., 1967). These decisions have been based 
on somewhat different rationales. Consider, e.g.: 
(a) State v. McCarty, 427 P.2d 616, 619-620 (Sup. Ct., Kan., 1967): 
Our attention is called to the recent case of Miranda v. 
State of Arizona) 384 U.S. 436. Apparently the defendants 
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would have us apply a Miranda prerequisite for an admissible 
confession to a valid consent to a search of private quarters. 
The defendants cite no authority in support of this con-
tention and our limited research has discovered none. 
It is our opinion, however, that the defendant's argument 
is unsound and must be rejected. Miranda deals only with the 
compulsory self-incrimination barred by the Fifth Amend-
ment, not with the unreasonable search and seizure proscribed 
by the Fourth Amendment. There is an obvious distinction 
between the purposes to be served by these two historic 
sections of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth Amendment pro-
hibits the odious practice of compelling a man to convict 
himself; the Fourth guards the sanctity of his home and pos-
sessions as those terms have been judicially interpreted. An 
indispensable element of compulsory self-incrimination is 
some degree of compulsion. The essential component of an 
unreasonable search and seizure is some sort of unreason-
ableness. 
No responsible court has yet said, to our knowledge, that 
before a valid voluntary consent to a search can be given, 
the person consenting must first be warned that whatever 
is discovered through the search may be used as evidence 
against him. We decline to be the first judicial body to 
espouse so dubious a theory .... 
(b) Rosenthall v. Henderson, 389 F.2d 514, 516, (6th Cir., 1968): 
Counsel for the Government apparently is under the im-
pression that the district judge held as a matter of law that 
it was necessary for the officers to inform Rosenthall prior 
to his com~nt that he had the right to withhold consent in 
the absence of a warrant. \Ve do not think this is the 
necessary inference from the judge's holding. We read his 
memorandum opinion as holding only that the Government 
had failed to sustain the burden of showing that Rosenthall's 
consent was intelligently given because, as was said in john-
son, there was no showing of "an intentional relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 
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It is true that the district judge relies heavily on United 
States v. Blalock, 255 F.Supp. 268 (E.D. Penn., 1966), which 
apparently holds that a subject must be informed of his right 
to refuse before legal consent can be obtained to search 
without a warrant. It is noted, however, that in Blalock it 
was also said that there was no evidence to show that Blalock 
was aware of his Fourth Amendment right. In other words, 
the Government had failed on the whole case to sustain its 
burden of proving that consent to search was intelligently 
given. But regardless of the interpretation which should be 
placed on Blalock, we adhere to the rule that whether con-
sent is freely or intelligently given is an issue of fact to be 
decided by the trial judge like any other factual issue. john-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) .... 
The failure to advise the defendant of his right to with-
hold consent is only one factor to be considered. The failure 
to so advise might have more weight in one case than in 
another. To advise a person with experience or training in 
this field that he has the right to refuse consent would be a 
waste of words. To fail to so advise another, who by low 
mentality or inexperience is obviously ignorant of his rights, 
might in some cases be decisive. Other cases would doubtless 
fall between these two extremes. 
(c) State v. Andrus, supra at 873: 
The very request for permission in this case clearly conveyed 
that a negative response was within the defendant's rights. 
Crowell Andrus, whose premises were searched, knew that he 
was believed to have committed cattle theft and that the 
officers were asking to search for more evidence of the theft 
when they sought permission to search the premises. . . . 
See also People v. Roberts, 55 Cal. Rptr. 62, 71 (Ct. App., 1966) 
(where the defendant was not in custody): 
[W]e are impressed by the argument of the Attorney Gen-
eral that the very request for permission to enter and search 
imparts advice that a negative response is within the de-
SEARCH BY CONSENT/ 133 
fendant's rights-when, as here, the implied finding is that 
the inquiries to the effect "may we enter" and "may we 
search" would be understood by the person questioned to 
be more than merely rhetorical. ... 
On the other side, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has 
held that a specific warning of Fourth Amendment rights is 
necessary-at least where the defendant was in police custody 
at the time he consented. United States v. Nickrash} 367 F.2d 740 
(7th Cir., 1966). Two other Federal Court opinions may be 
viewed as taking a similar position, United States v. Blalock} 
255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa., 1966) and United States v. Moderacki} 
280 F. Supp'. 633 (D. Del., 1968), although each also seems to sug-
gest that the warning would not be necessary in a case where 
the Government could show that the defendant otherwise "had 
full knowledge of his rights." See id. at 636, F.n.l. Compare, Mir-
anda v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 436, 468 (1966) (refusing to "pause to 
inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of 
his rights without a warning being given.") The Nikrash court 
did not discuss its reasons for requiring a warning, but relied on 
Blalock. The court there said: 
First, the consent must have been "intelligent." Obviously, 
the requirement of an "intelligent" consent implies that the 
subject of the search must have been aware of his rights, for 
an intelligent consent can only embrace the waiver of a 
"known right." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); United 
States ex rel. Mancini v. Rundle} 337 F.2d 268 (C.A.3, 1964). 
Certainly, one cannot intelligently surrender that which he 
does not know he has. Cf. United States ex rel. Mancini v. 
Rundle, suj;ra; Walker v. PejJersack} 316 F.2d 119 (C.A.4, 
1963). The agents here properly warned defendant of his 
right to counsel and his right to remain silent, but they did 
not warn him of his right to refuse a warrantless search. The 
Fourth Amendment requires no less knowing a waiver than 
do the Fifth and Sixth. The requirement of knowledge in 
each serves the same purpose, i.e., to prevent the possibility 
that the ignorant may surrender their rights more readily 
134 / S E A R C H A N D S E I Z U R E 
than the shrewd. Conceivably, the assent of the defendant 
may have been "the false bravado of the small-time criminal," 
judd, supra, 190 F.2d at 651; or it may have been an untutored 
submission to authority. Which it was could have been re-
solved by the officers at the scene. To require law enforce-
ment agents to advise the subjects of investigation of their 
right to insist on a search warrant would impose no great 
burden, nor would it unduly or unnecessarily impede 
criminal investigation .... [255 F. Supp. at 268-69]. 
Consider also the rationale suggested in State v. Williams, 432 P. 
2d 679 (Ore. Sup. Ct., 1967): 
The principle announced in Escobedo v. State of Illinois 
... as interpreted by us in State v. Neely ... is applicable 
not only to interrogations leading up to confessions but is 
equally applicable to interrogation aimed at obtaining the 
defendant's consent to search and seizure when he is a focal 
suspect in the custody of the police. In effect, the request to 
search is a request that defendant be a witness against him-
self which he is privileged to refuse under the Fifth Amend-
ment [ 432 P .2d at 682-683]. 
One federal court has suggested that even if Fourth Amend-
ment warnings are generally viewed as necessary, a different rule 
should apply where the defendant was warned of his Miranda 
rights, submitted to orderly interrogation and subsequently con-
sented to a search. See Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 
(lst Cir., 1967): 
Although the analogy with Miranda v. State of Arizona} 
384 U.S. 436 (1966), has a surface plausibility, we do not 
think that the Miranda prescription, formulated to give thres-
hold warnings of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights at the 
earliest critical time in a criminal proceeding, must or 
ought to be mechanistically duplicated when circumstances 
indicate the advisability of requesting a search. In the first 
place, advocacy of an automatic second-warning system mis-
understands and downgrades the warnings required by Mir-
anrla. Their purpose was not to add a perfunctory ritual to 
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police procedures but to be a set of procedural safeguards "to 
inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure 
a continuous opportunity to exercise it." 384 U.S. a.t 444. 
These constitute "an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the 
inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere." ld. at 
468. The obligation of the interrogators is not discharged by 
the adequate and effective appraisal of the accused's rights. 
"If * * * he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the 
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before 
speaking there can be no questioning." Jd. at 444-45. While 
the police interrogators must faithfully carry out Miranda's 
mandate at the threshold, they may then proceed to elicit 
responses, however incriminating, without further specific 
warning. To single out for further warning a request to 
search premises of an accused is to assume that a different 
order of risks has not been covered at the threshold. But 
that things which might be found in a search could be used 
against an accused seems implicit in the warning of the 
right to remain silent which, as the Court observed, is calcu-
lated to make him "more acutely aware * * * that he is 
not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest." 
384 U.S. at 469. 
Moreover, the rules governing searches are concerned not 
with the exclusion of unreliable evidence (such as a confession 
stemming from fear or force) or with the exclusion of self-
incriminating statements (whether reliable or not) or with 
the need to assure a defendant that he may have a lawyer 
before any further interrogation, but with the maintenance 
of civilized standards of police practice. The objective of 
this policy would seem to have been achieved when police 
have given the basic Miranda warnings, when a defendant 
subsequently voluntarily submits to an orderly interrogation 
free from any coerciveness other than that implicit in the 
fact of arrest and custody, when a straightforward request for 
permission to search is made, and when an unambiguous and 
positive response is received. 
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We therefore see no reason in policy or precedent auto-
matically to borrow a procedure adapted to one set of con-
stitutional rights at one stage of a criminal proceeding and 
apply it to a quite different right, serving quite different 
purposes, at another stage .... [380 F.2d at 164]. 
However, the contrary view was taken in United States v. 
Moderacki, supra at 636: 
While [the Gorman] argument carries some persuasion, I 
adhere to the result reached in Nickrash and Blalock. The 
key to a voluntary waiver is whether it was done knowingly. 
An inference that a person has been warned is not one and 
the same thing as an actual warning. The rule of waiver is 
not intended so much for the protection of the cool, hard-
ened, criminal as for the slow-witted offender and perhaps, on 
occasion, the innocent person caught in a web of circum-
stances who becomes frightened or confused. The former, but 
not necessarily the latter might suspect that the Miranda-type 
warning is equally applicable to a search. 
It is obviously repetitive, and may even seem slightly 
ridiculous, for an officer, having once given the Miranda 
warning before taking a suspect's statement, to have to repeat 
relatively the same warning before searching his person. But 
only in this fashion can it be known beyond doubt that the 
suspect, in emptying his pockets, has done so with a full 
knowledge of what he is doing. Lacking an explicit warning 
as to his rights under the Fourth Amendment, it can never 
be known with certainty whether a defendant voluntarily 
waived those rights. Accordingly, the search was unlawful 
insofar as it rests upon the defendant's waiver of his rights 
[280 F.Supp. at 636]. 
C. Consent Subsequent to a Claim of Authority. 
Many courts have recognized that an officer's original reliance 
on a claim of authority is an important factor working against a 
finding of voluntary consent. See, e.g., United States v. Kelih, 
272 Fed. 484 (S.D. Ill., 1921); Rogers v. United States, 369 F.2d 
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944 (lOth Cir., 1966); Villano v. United States) 310 F.2d 680 (lOth 
Cir., 1962). Nevertheless, decisions frequently hold that, despite 
the officer's original claim, other circumstances support a finding 
that the subsequent consent was voluntary. In State v. Purdy, 153 
N.W.2d 254 (Minn. Sup. Ct., 1967), for example, the Court upheld 
consent given after the officers had told the defendant that "a 
search of the entire car was going to be made and, if the key to 
the trunk could not be found, he would break into the trunk." 
The defendant then replied, "You might as well have the key" 
and opened his lips and projected the key which he had held 
between his teeth. Id. at 257. The Court held that the de-
fendant's "failure to object to the search ... [was] evidence of 
consent." The opinion also noted that after the officer opened 
the trunk, the defendant had volunteered that what the officers 
wanted (narcotics) was in a round brown box. Similarly, in State 
v. Hamilton) 141 S.E.2d 506 (1964), approved) 260 F.Supp. 632 
(E.D.N.C., 1966), the Court sustained a voluntary consent given 
after a police officer stated that he lacked a search warrant, but 
that "he could get one." The Court emphasized that defendant, 
who was under arrest, then responded, "There is no need of that, 
you can search." 141 S.E.2d at 509. 
A recent Supreme Court decision, Bumper v. North Caro-
lina) 36 U.S.L.W. 4513 (U.S. June 3, 1968) clearly casts doubt 
on Purdy and possibly on Hamilton also. The Court there held 
invalid consent to search given by defendant's grandmother after 
the officers involved had told her they possessed a warrant. The 
officers had visited the grandmother's home, where defendant 
lived, prior to the defendant's arrest. The grandmother met the 
officers at the door, where one of them announced, "I have a 
warrant to search your house." The grandmother responded "go 
ahead" and opened the door. In the kitchen they found a rifle 
later introduced as evidence against defendant. At the trial, the 
prosecutor did not rely on the warrant, but sought to justify the 
search upon the grandmother's consent. The Supreme Court 
quoted the grandmother's testimony (relied upon by the lower 
court) at length: 
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"Four of them came. I was busy about my work, and they 
walked into the house and one of them walked up and said, 
'I have a search warrant to search your house,' and I walked 
out and told them to come on in .... He just come on in and 
said he had a warrant to search the house, and he didn't read 
it to me or nothing. So, I just told him to come on in and go· 
ahead and search, and I went on about my work. I wasn't 
concerned what he was about. I was just satisfied. He just 
told me he had a search warrant, but he didn't read it to me. 
He did tell me he had a search warrant. ... 
"He said he was the law and had a search warrant to 
search the house, why I thought he could go ahead. I believed 
he had a search warrant. I took him at his word. . . . I just 
seen them out there in the yard. They got through the door 
when I opened it. At that time, I did not know my grandson 
had been charged with crime. Nobody told me anything. 
They didn't tell me anything, just picked it up like that. 
They didn't tell me nothing about my grandson .... " 
The Court also noted in a footnote that the grandmother had 
also testified: 
"I had no objection to them making a search of my house. 
I was willing to let them look in any room or drawer in my 
house they wanted to. Nobody threatened me with anything. 
Nobody told me they were going to hurt me if I didn't let 
them search my house. Nobody told me they would give me 
money if I would let them search. I let them search, and it 
was all my own free will. Nobody forced me at all. ... 
"I just give them a free will to look because I felt like the 
boy wasn't guilty."4 
4. The Court then stated: 
The transcript of the suppression hearing comes to us from North 
Carolina in the form of a narrative; i.e., the actual questions and answers 
have been rewritten in the form of continuous first person testimony. The 
effect is to put into the mouth of the witness some of the words of the 
attorneys. In the case of an obviously compliant witness like Mrs. Leath, 
the result is a narrative that has the tone of decisiveness but is shot 
through with contradictions. 
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The Court's opinion treated the basic issue somewhat more 
broadly, perhaps, than might be anticipated from the grand-
mother's testimony. The opinion stated: 
The issue thus presented is whether a search can be justi-
fied as lawful on the basis of consent when that 'consent' 
has been given only after the official conducting the search 
has asserted that he possesses a warrant. We hold that there 
can be no consent under such circumstances. 
When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify 
the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that 
the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This 
burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than 
acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. A search con-
ducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified 
on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was 
invalid. The result can be no different when it turns out that 
the State does not even attempt to rely upon the validity of 
the warrant, or fails to show that there was, in fact, any 
warrant at all. 
When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search 
a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the 
occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is 
instinct with coercion-albeit lawful coercion. Where there 
is coercion there cannot be consent. 
Note should be taken also of the various lower court opinions 
cited by the Court in discussing acquiescence to official authority. 
Footnote 14, for example, included the following citations and 
quotations: 
Orderly submission to law-enforcement officers who, in 
effect, represented to the defendant that they had the author-
ity to enter and search the house, against his will if necessary, 
was not such consent as constituted an understanding, inten-
tional and voluntary waiver by the defendant of his funda-
mental rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Consti-
tution. United States v. Elliot, 210 F. Supp. 357, 360. 
One is not held to have consented to the search of his 
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premises where it is accomplished pursuant to an apparently 
valid search warrant. On the contrary, the legal effect is that 
consent is on the basis of such a warrant and his permission 
is construed as an intention to abide by the law and not 
resist the search under the warrant, rather than an invita-
tion to search. Bull v. Armstrong, 48 So. 2d 467, 470 
(S. C. Ala.). 
The Court also cites: Meno v. State, 164 N.E. 93, 96 (S. C. Ind.); 
Salata v. United States) 286 F. 125; Brown v. State) 167 So. 2d 281 
(C. A. Ala.); Mattingly v. Commonwealth) 250 S.W. 105 (C. A. 
Ky.). Cf. Gibson v. United States) 149 F. 2d 381; Naples v. Max-
well, 271 F. Supp. 850; Atwood v. State, 280 P. 319 (Crim. C. A. 
Okla.); State v. Watson, 98 So. 241 (S.C. Miss.). 
Although three justices wrote separately in Bumper) only one 
(Justice Black) disagreed with the Court's conclusion on the issue 
of consent. 
D. Other Relevant Factors. 
Because a person in police custody is more likely to be under 
pressure to give permission for a search, courts generally have 
been more demanding in examining allegedly voluntary "in-
custody" consents. See judd v. United States) 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. 
Cir., 1951); Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir., 
1960). Recent cases have emphasized, however, that the factor of 
custody does not necessarily preclude a finding of "voluntariness." 
See) e.g.) State v. Herring) 421 P.2d 767 (N. Mex. Sup. Ct., 1967); 
PeojJle v. Camjmzano, 61 Cal. Rptr. 695 (Ct. App., 1967); State v. 
Leavitt, 237 A.2d 309 (R.I. Sup. Ct., 1967). Typical is the fol-
lowing statement from Leavitt, sujJra: 
\Ve are unrestrainedly in accord with the proposition that 
an accused's consent to a search is a waiver of the protection 
guaranteed to him by the constitutions of this state and the 
United States. Such waiver is never to be presumed. It must 
be clearly shown to have been freely and knowingly given, 
uninduced by not only actual but implied duress. [Citing 
judd and Channel) supra.] 
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Where as here the asserted consent is obtained from one 
under arrest, custodially secured in a police station with its 
attendant ambient of officialdom, there is present a situation 
which suggests the probability that the acquiescence was 
submission to authority rather than an intelligent waiver. 
See judd) supra. 
Even so, it has never been held that a finding of consent, 
freely and intelligently given, is precluded as a matter of 
law when obtained from one under arrest and officially 
secured. That valid consent was obtained under such cir-
cumstances is still a question of fact to be determined by the 
trial justice in the first instance, although the burden on the 
state is to establish such consent by clear and convincing 
evidence [237 A.2d at 318]. 
Several other factors, besides custody, considered in determin-
ing the validity of a consent were recently listed in United States 
v. Lewis) 274 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y., 1967): 
Among the factors that may be considered in determining 
the effectiveness and validity of a consent to search are 
whether at the time when it was given the defendant was 
under arrest, judd v. United States) supra)· United States v. 
McCunn, 40 F.2d 295 (S.D.N.Y., 1930); whether he was over 
powered by arresting officers, handcuffed, or similarly sub-
ject to physical restrictions, e. g.) United States v. McCunn) 
supra)· PeojJle v. Zazzetta) 27 Ill.2d 302, 189 N .E.2d 260 
( 1963); whether the keys to the premises searched had already 
been seized by the police from the defendant, e. g.) United 
States v. Fowler, 17 F.R.D. 499 (D.Calif., 1955); PeojJle v. 
Porter) 37 Misc.2d 73, 236 N .Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct. Queens 
County, 1962); whether the defendant employed evasive 
conduct or attempted to mislead the police, Castaneda v. 
Superior Court, 59 Cal.2d 439, 30 Cal. Rptr. I, 380 P.2d 641 
(1963, per Justice Traynor); and whether he denied guilt or 
the presence of any incriminatory objects in his premises, 
e.g., United States v. Gregory, supra; United States v. Kidd, 
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153 F.Supp. 605 (D.La., 1957); United States v. Wallace, 160 
F.Supp. 859 (D.Colo., 1958). 
The presence of some or all of the aforementioned factors 
is not controlling, since (as the Government concedes) each 
case "must stand or fall on its own special facts," United 
States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949, 950-951 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied 360 U.S. 912 (1959). These factors, however, are 
probative indicia on the issue of whether a purported consent 
is valid and effective. Although the defendant need not 
express a "positive desire" to have the search conducted in 
order to render his consent a voluntary waiver, United States 
v. Thompson, supra, 356 F.2d at p. 220, it must amount to 
more than mere submission or acquiescence in the nature of 
resignation to constitute a valid waiver. United States v. 
Alberti, supra; United States v. Sully, 56 F.Supp. 942 
(S.D.N.Y. 1944) [274 F.Supp. at 187-88]. 
The application of these factors in a specific fact situation is 
illustrated in the recent case of U!7ited States v. Shropshire, 271 
F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La., 1967). There a confederate of the de-
fendant was summarily arrested at 4:00 a.m. while leaving a 
bar. A search disclosed a loaded gun and a key to a motel 
room. The officers took the confederate to the motel, where, after 
checking the records, they found the room to have been 
registered in defendant's name. The officers then tried to open 
the door with the key, but were unsuccessful because of an inside 
safety latch. They then knocked on the door. When the defendant 
asked who was there, his confederate responded, "It's Charlie." 
The defendant then opened the door and was confronted by the 
officers. The testimony as to what occurred at that point was in 
dispute. The officers testified that they identified themselves and 
asked permission to search the room, noting that the defendant 
had the right to refuse. The defendant then reportedly said, 
"Go right ahead, everything is all right." The subsequent search 
uncovered a number of counterfeit bills. The Court found that 
the consent was ineffective even under the officer's testimony. 
It noted: 
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When police identify themselves as such, search a room 
and find contraband in it, the occupant's words or signs 
of acquiescence in the search accompanied by a denial of 
guilt do not show consent. Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 
819 (1954). This is particularly true when a man is 
awakened at an early morning hour, opens the door, clad 
only in his underwear, expecting to see a friend and is 
confronted by a force of five strange men seeking entry. It 
is incredible that [the defendant) ... would have volun-
tarily consented to a search which he knew would disclose 
incriminating evidence. His words should be considered an 
involuntary submission to authority and therefore insufficient 
to waive a constitutional right [271 F. Supp. 524). 
Particularly noteworthy in Shropshire is the Court's emphasis on 
the fact that defendant obviously knew the search would incrim-
inate him. The Higgins case cited by the Court placed consider-
able emphasis on this factor. See 209 F.2d at 820. Other courts 
have taken note of the other side of the coin-the likelihood 
that the defendant believed that the search would turn up 
nothing. See e.g.) United States v. Nickers, 387 F.2d 703 (4th 
Cir., 1967) (where the defendant had marked money of which 
he was probably unaware). Of course, the potentially incriminat-
ing nature of the search may also be offset by evidence that the 
party was attempting to make a clean breast of his guilt when he 
gave his consent. See United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944); 
United States v. Rivera, 321 F.2d 704 (2d Cir., 1963). 
Various other factors have also been noted as indicating the 
"true voluntariness" of a consent. Courts have emphasized, in 
particular, defendant's own initiation of the search, or at least 
initiation of the investigation leading to the search. See State v. 
Kotka, 152 N.W.2d 445 (Minn. Sup. Ct., 1967); Gibson v. State, 
423 S.W.2d 330 (Tex., 1968). Emphasis has also been placed upon 
the defendant's lack of hesitancy in agreeing to the search. See 
State v. Leavitt, 237 A.2d :109 (R.I. Sup. Ct., 1967). 
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E. The Continuing Effect of a Voluntary Consent. 
May a consent, admittedly voluntary when originally given, 
be used to justify a second search of the same area made 
several hours after the original search had proved fruitless? Two 
recent cases suggest potentially conflicting approaches in dealing 
with this issue. In People v. Nawrocki, 148 N.W.2d 2ll (Mich. 
Ct. App., 1967), the court upheld the search based on the 
earlier consent. The defendant there had been arrested on 
Sunday morning while driving his car. Riding with him was a 
friend wanted on a charge for nonsupport. The arresting officer 
asked the defendant if he could search the car, and the defendant 
agreed. The search uncovered no incriminating evidence. The 
officer then took the defendant to jail and impounded the car. 
The basis for this action is not discussed in the court opinion, 
except to suggest that the police might have been acting illegally. 
At the jail defendant was booked and the jailer took his 
valuables, including his car keys. Later in the afternoon the 
arresting officer took the keys from the defendant's personal 
effects and again searched the car, finding incriminating evidence 
that lead to a forgery charge being brought against the defendant. 
In finding that the consent validated the search, the Court of 
Appeals simply noted that "according to the testimony, . . . 
[defendant] freely and intelligently gave permission to search the 
car any time." 
In State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418 (Ma. Sup. Ct., 1967), the 
Court reached a different conclusion in a factually distinguishable 
case. There, the defendant had been called to the police station 
on December 5th shortly after his wife's death and asked for 
consent to search his home. At the time, there was some question 
as to whether the wife's death was accidental or homicide. The 
officer in charge, however, did inform defendant that "in a case 
of this nature, everyone is suspect." The defendant "consented 
to the authorities searching his home and indeed urged that they 
do so, indicating his desire that the cause of his wife's death 
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be established." Shortly thereafter, the police searched the house 
and found nothing. Later the same day, the police received 
damaging testimony that led to defendant's arrest. The next 
morning, December 6th, they conducted a second search of the 
house which turned up damaging evidence. The trial court 
sustained the search on the basis of the consent, which it treated 
as "remaining valid and viable until specifically reyoked or its 
purpose accomplished." The Maine Supreme Court rejected this 
position on the following grounds: 
The officers entered the defendant's home on the 5th under 
the protection of his consent. By nightfall, however, the 
defendant had ceased to be the husband assisting in the 
solution of his wife's death and had become the man 
accused of his wife's murder by poison held under arrest 
for hearing. 
When the defendant became the accused, the protective 
cloak of the Constitution became more closely wrapped 
about him. For our purpqses we need consider only the 
Federal Constitution. Like principles are applicable under 
our State Constitution, Article I, Section 5. There is a 
particularly heavy burden on the State to show consent to a 
search and seizure without a warrant when the defendant is 
under arrest. Burke v. United States (CA 1) 328 F.2d 399; 
judd v. United States, 89 U.S. App.D.C. 64, 190 F.2d 649. 
The consent of December 5 in our view should be measured 
on the morning of the 6th by the status of the defendant as 
the accused. There is no evidence whatsoever that the consent 
of the 5th was ever discussed with the defendant at or after 
his arrest, or that he was informed of the State's intent to 
enter and search his home on the 6th on the strength of a 
continuing consent. We conclude, therefore, that the consent 
of the defendant had ended by December 6, and accordingly 
the officers were not protected thereby on the successful 
search of the fith [237 A.2d at 421]. 
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V. Consent By a Person Other Than the Defendant. 
A. General Background. 
Ordinarily, one's personal constitutional rights cannot be 
waived by another person. In the area of consent searches, how-
ever, courts have long recognized that a valid consent given by 
one co-tenant permits use of the seized evidence against the 
other. See) e.g.) United States v. Heine, 149 F.2d 485 (2d Cir., 
1945). This doctrine was originally developed in the context of 
one spouse consenting to the search of premises for evidence 
that might incriminate the other. Such consents were sometimes 
upheld on the theory that the wife was the agent of the husband. 
See United States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y., 1937). 
More recent decisions, however, have relied on the theory that 
any person who has the right to full use of the property obviously 
can waive his privacy therein, and, if this happens to injure his 
co-tenant, that is merely the price one pays for sharing the 
property. As one court put it, "where two persons have equal 
rights to the use or occupation of premises, either may give 
consent to a search and the evidence thus disclosed can be 
used against either." People v. Shambley, 122 N.E.2d 172, 174 
(Ill. Sup Ct., 1954). 
The Supreme Court has never directly considered this theory 
in a co-tenancy situation. In Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 
(1921), the Court found it unnecessary to consider the issue since 
the wife's consent there had clearly been coerced. In several 
later cases the Court held that a landlord could not consent to 
the search of his tenant's quarters. See Stoner v. California, 376 
U.S. 483 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961). 
The emphasis in each case, however, was on the limited interest 
of the owner. Still there was at least some general language in 
Stoner) supra) that might raise some question concerning the 
validity of consents by co-tenants: 
It is important to bear in mind that it was the petitioner's 
constitutional right which was at stake here, and not the night 
clerk's nor the hotel's. It was a right therefore which only the 
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petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly or 
through an agent. 376 U.S. at 489. Cf. Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("The Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places."). 
On the other hand, in Bumper v. North Carolina [discussed 
supra Section IV (C)], the Court did not question the right of 
the grandmother to permit the search of her home for evidence 
incriminating her grandson who also lived there. While the 
Court found the grandmother's consent was involuntary, it did 
make reference to the effect of her consent in Footnote 11 (36 
U.S.L.W., 4515): 
[The grandmother] owned both the house and the rifle. 
The petitioner concedes that her voluntary consent to the 
search would have been binding upon him. Conversely, there 
can be no question of the petitioner's standing to challenge 
the lawfulness of the search. He was the "one against whom 
the search was directed," jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 
261, and the house searched was his home. The rifle was used 
by all members of the household and was found in the 
common part of the house. 
B. The Interest Needed to Authorize a Search of Premises. 
The courts generally have insisted that consent come from a 
tenant who is presently occupying the premises. Most cases have 
involved husbands and wives. Recent decisions have upheld con-
sents given by paramours who actually shared the premises on a 
continuing basis. See jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262 (Del. Sup. Ct., 
1967); United States v. A irdo, 380 F.2d 103 (7th Cir., 1967). It must 
clearly be shown, however, that the paramour had an "equal 
right or joint control" over the premises. People v. Rodriguez, 223 
N .E.2d 414 (Ill. Ct. App., 1967) (rejecting consent given by a 
paramour). Cf. State v. Bellows, 432 P.2d 654 (Wash. Sup. Ct., 
1967). Of course, the individual also must have the proper 
capacity within the household. Several recent decisions have 
rejected consent given by a minor child who lives in the house-
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hold. See) e.g.) May v. State, 199 So.2d 635 (Miss. Sup. Ct., 1967); 
State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418 (Ma. Sup. Ct., 1967). 
In Chapman v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a 
landlord could not consent to the search of rented premises 
occupied by a tenant. 365 U.S. 610 (1961). A recent lower court 
decision, United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2nd Cir., 1966), 
raises a serious question concerning the scope of the Chapman 
ruling. In that case, the defendant Botsch had authorized his 
lessor Stein to use his key to the premises for the purpose of 
accepting deliveries. Stein also signed receipts for the deliveries and 
paid the deliverymen. When Stein learned from the postal in-
spectors that the deliveries may have been part of a mail fraud 
scheme, he "unlocked the [leased] shanty and asked the inspectors 
if they wished to enter in order to examine what was stored 
there." The Court distinguished Chapman on the following 
grounds: 
We are unpersuaded by our dissenting brother's reliance 
on Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), where the 
Court invalidated a search made with a landlord's consent. 
In Chapman, the landlord did not possess a key to the 
dwelling. In the case before us, Stein not only possessed a key 
to the shack with Botsch's knowledge and approval, but 
Botsch expressly authorized him to use it for the purpose 
of accepting the deliveries which flowed from the fraudulent 
scheme. Thus, Stein and Botsch did not occupy a mere 
landlord-tenant relationship; Stein, having been made an 
unwitting accomplice by Botsch, had a vital interest in co-
operating with the Inspectors so that he could remove any 
taint of suspicion cast upon him. Indeed, any individual 
under similar circumstances would have a right to promptly 
and voluntarily exculpate himself by establishing that his 
role in the alleged scheme was entirely innocent and passive. 
This right to exculpate oneself also decisively distinguishes 
the November 6 search from those condemned in the so-called 
"hotel" cases relied upon by our dissenting colleague: Stoner 
v. State of California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); United States v. 
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Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 
74 (1949). While it is true that in each of these cases, the 
manager or clerk possessed a key to the hotel rooms, the 
circumstances did not warrant the conclusion that the key 
was to be utilized for anything other than to furnish the 
usual and normal conveniences to the guests such as per-
mitting maids to enter in order to make beds, clean, etc. In 
none of these cases was the manager or clerk an innocent 
accomplice in illegal activities and in none of them was the 
key which he retained unknowingly utilized in furtherance 
of an illicit scheme. 
If this were a simple case of a landlord authorizing a search 
of his tenant's property and no more, or, to use our dis-
senting brother's illustration, of a neighbor placing mail or 
a package inside and consenting to a search of an absent 
householder's dwelling merely because someone "suspects 
that a package or letter may have contained evidence of 
fraud," we would be presented with an entirely different 
question. But, here, as Judge Dooling found: 
Stein was not an inactive landlord, aloof from his ten-
ant's activities and immune from any taint that inhered 
in them. * * * If the merchandise was being stolen through 
a confidence trick or obtained by a fraudulent scheme 
utilizing the mails, Stein was as guilty as his principal 
Botsch unless he was innocent in mind; his were, objec-
tively, acts that were facilitating a fraud or theft or 
both. * * * 
Because Stein's activities-though innocent-were inextricably 
intertwined with Botsch's alleged scheme and cast suspicion 
him, we believe his authorization of the inspection when 
viewed in its full context rendered the search reasonable. 
Cf-> Marshall v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir., 1965), 
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1010 (1966); United States v. Eldridge, 
302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir., 1962); Von Eichelberger v. United 
States, 252 F.2d 184 (9th Cir., 1958). It would be a harsh 
doctrine, indeed, that would prevent an innocent pawn from 
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removing the taint of suspicion which had been cast upon 
him by a defendant's cunning scheme. Stein's innocence stood 
or fell on the very merchandise which, only after inquiry 
and inspection, could exculpate him. 
It is urged, rp.oreover, that we should invalidate the 
November 6 search because the Government failed to establish 
that it would have been prejudiced by any delay which would 
have resulted from a formal search warrant application. We 
recognize the force of this argument; courts should not be 
niggardly in extending the protection of constitutional rights 
and there is much to be said for interposing a magistrate 
between enforcement officers and potential defendants. 
Nevertheless, in the circumstances presented here, we are 
not persuaded that the officers' failure to obtain a warrant 
rendered the search unreasonable. Once Stein, without being 
urged, coerced or imposed upon, invited the inspection, we 
believe for the reasons already stated, that Daly and Mailloux 
were wholly justified in examining the premises [364 F.2d 
at 547-48]. 
A dissenting opinion found this reasoning unconvincing: 
It has been held that even the consent of one lawfully in 
possession or occupancy cannot make reasonable a search 
into another's personal effects. Holzhey v. United States, 223 
F.2d 823 (5th Cir., 1955); United States v. Blok, 88 U.S. 
App.D.C. 326, 188 F.2d 1019 (1951); Reeves v. Warden, 346 
F.2d 915 (4th Cir., 1965) .... These cases recognize that 
even if one's right to entry is unlimited, consent may be 
ineffective to make reasonable a search. 
Similarly, when the right to entry is limited, the consent 
is less effective. It has long been held that where one's right 
to possession or occupancy is as great as another's, consent 
can be effective. Reszutek v. United States, 147 F.2d 142 (2d 
Cir., 1945); Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied 334 U.S. 844 (1948); see the cases collected in 
Eldridge, sujJra, 302 F.2d at 465, notes 3-6. In such a case 
consent is not usually made on behalf of the absent person. 
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The consenting person has an independent right to permit 
the search. In other situations, where the consenting person 
has a lesser right to occupancy or possession, which might not 
alone permit a search on consent, it has sometimes been 
held that the absent person has made the consenting party 
his agent to consent, see Teasley v. United States, 292 F.2d 
460 (9th Cir., 1961), or that he accepts the risk of effective 
consent, Marshall, supra, but such an agency must be clearly 
shown. Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir., 1931). 
Since consent was here given while Stein was not engaged 
in receiving or paying for shipments, we are not called upon 
to decide either whether or not Botsch authorized Stein to 
consent to searches while engaged in such activity, or whether 
or not Stein's right to enter then would be sufficient to make 
effective his own consent, for entry, or for search, or for 
both. When he consented to the entry, and opened the door, 
he was in no different a position from the hotel clerk in 
Stoner, the hotel manager in Lustig v. United States, 338 
U.S. 74 (1949) and United States v. jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), 
or the landlord in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 
( 1961 ). I cannot agree that the suspicion which naturally 
would be cast on Stein compels a different result than these 
cases. It neither increased his right to occupancy nor created 
an agency so that Stein could give Botsch's consent. Nor can 
it be said that Botsch "accepted the risk," as in Marshall, that 
Stein would let the Inspectors search. That, like the implied 
agency, is a species of the "unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent 
· authority' " condemned in Stoner. The fact that Stein, like 
the hotel clerk, at some time could properly enter is no 
reason to infer either authority to enter on an occasion such 
as this, or to give Botsch's consent. And it defies reason to 
conclude that Botsch intended that Stein, out of his unwitting 
role in the fraud, could effectively consent to a search. If this 
search was good, any neighbor with whom a key is left so 
that newspapers, mail or packages may be put inside the door 
in a householder's absence may authorize a general search 
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of the house if anyone suspects that a package or letter may 
have contained evidence of fraud. I would not so erode the 
right to be free from unreasonable searches in order to 
sustain the conviction of this rascal. I would reverse [364 
F.2d at 542, at 551 (1966)]. 
C. Limitations Upon the Scope of the Search Authorized by 
the Third Party. 
Recent decisions have emphasized that even where a co-tenant 
could authorize a search of the premises generally, this would 
not include those personal effects of the defendant in which the 
co-tenant had no interest. Thus People v. Egan, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
627 (Cal. App., 1967) held that consent of an owner to search 
his apartment does not authorize opening and searching a kit 
bag belonging to the defendant (owner's stepson). The court 
stressed that the owner had no "right, title or interest in the 
kit bag." 58 Cal. Rptr. at 630. Cf. Nugent v. Superior Court, 62 
Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App., 1967). But cf. United States v. Garret, 
371 F.2d 296 (7th Cir., 1966). Courts have divided over the 
application of this principle to a bedroom occupied solely by the 
defendant. Several have held that, where the defendant was an 
"invitee" and not a real "tenant," the owner can consent to the 
search of the defendant's room. See Weaver v. Lane, 382 F.2d 251 
(7th Cir., 1967); SjJencer v. People, 429 F.2d 266 (Colo. Sup. Ct., 
1967). Cf. United States v. Pasterchik, 267 F. Supp. 44 (Ore., 1966). 
In People v. Overall, 151 N.W.2d 225 (Mich. Ct. App., 1967), the 
court ruled that a grandmother who owned the home could not 
authorize the search of her grandson's room. The opinion did 
not attempt to distinguish the "invitee" cases, but simply relied 
on Stoner v. California, sujJra. Apparently, the grandson in 
Overall was not a minor, although the court does not stress this 
point. Other courts have consistently upheld a parent's right 
to authorize search of a minor's living quarters. See, e.g., Maxwell 
v. StejJhens, 229 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ark., 1964); McCray v. State, 
202 A.2d 320 (Md. Ct. App., 1964). See also State v. Little, 431 
P.2d 810 (Ore. Sup. Ct., 1967) [holding that a mother could 
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consent to the bodysearch (blood and pubic hair) of a 15 year 
old child-though it should be noted that the child here did not 
object]. 
D. Consent Where One Joint Occupant Objects. 
Since the effectiveness of a co-tenant's consent is premised upon 
his personal property interest (rather than the waiver of the 
other's rights), one might assume that consent would be valid 
even if the defendant co-tenant were present and objected to the 
search. However, a recent Maryland decision, Dorsey v. State, 
232 A.2d 900 (Md. Ct. App., 1967) reaches a contrary conclusion. 
Officers there were denied the right to search an apartment by 
one of the defendants, but received permission from the female 
occupant, who stated that she paid the rent for the apartment 
out of her welfare check. [There was some dispute as to the 
voluntariness and scope of her consent, but the court found the 
consent invalid without reaching these issues.] The court con-
cluded that defendant, who testified to living in the apartment 
"off and on," was a joint occupant of the apartment and that his 
objection invalidated the consent of the female occupant: 
In Nestor v. State, 243 Md. 438, 443, 221 A.2d 364, 367, the 
court held that one co-tenant may give consent to a search 
and the evidence there disclosed can be used against the 
other tenant "whose permission to enter and search the 
premises had not been elicited." Hence, in Bellam v. State, 
233 Md. 368, 196 A.2d 891, the consent of a wife as a joint 
occupant of a residence with her husband was held sufficient 
to bind her husband, who was not present. In McCray v. 
State, 236 Md. 9, 202 A.2d 320, it was held that the consent 
of a parent to search a part of his dwelling used by his son 
who resided there only occasionally, and who was not present 
at the time of the search, was binding on the son. But, as 
pointed out in Nestor, 243 Md. at p. 443, 221 A.2d at p. 367, 
that the consent of one co-tenant may bind the other "does 
not stem from the implication that a consenting tenant may 
waive the other's constitutional rights against trespass and 
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unreasonable searches and seizures, but rather from the 
possessory rights of the co-tenant to admit to the jointly 
controlled premises whomsoever he wishes, including police 
officers." Unlike Bellam or McCray, Gladden, as the co-
occupant in the instant case, was present and expressly ob-
jected to the search without a warrant, thus making the 
factual situation similar to that before the Supreme ·court of 
California in Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.2d 65, 27 
Cal.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d ll3. In that case, a co-tenant was 
arrested and gave police authority to search his apartment. 
The police attempted to search the apartment without a 
search warrant against the express objection of the arrestee's 
co-tenant. In holding that the police officers committed a 
trespass and made an unreasonable search and seizure, the 
Court said (page 892 of 27 Cal. Rptr., page 116 of 378 P.2d): 
Joint occupancy of property, particularly residential 
property, obviously demands reasonable restrictions on the 
right of each joint occupant either by himself or through 
another to exercise full control over the property at all 
times regardless of the wishes of another joint occupant 
present on the premises. A joint occupant's right of privacy 
in his home is not completely at the mercy of another with 
whom he shares legal possession .... 
Accordingly, we hold that one joint occupant who is 
away from the premises may not authorize police officers 
to enter and search the premises over the objection of an-
other joint occupant who is present at the time, at least 
where as in this case, no prior warning is given, no emer-
gency exists and the officer fails even to disclose his purpose 
to the occupant who is present or to inform him that he 
has the consent of the absent occupant to enter. 
See also Lucero v. Donovan1 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir.), a case in 
which authority given to search residential premises by one 
having occupancy privileges therein was held rescinded by 
the other occupant's expressed protest to entry by the police 
[232 Md. at 902]. 
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VI. The Need For a Warrant. 
A. Background. 
The Fourth Amendment is composed of two conjunctive 
clauses. The first guarantees the right of the people against un-
reasonable searches, and the second sets forth the conditions 
under which a warrant may issue (i.e., probable cause, particu-
larly in description of property, etc.). The relationship between 
these two clauses has been the subject of considerable dispute 
over the years. Some judges view the clauses as largely separate, 
treating the use of a warrant as one factor in determining the 
reasonableness of the search, but not an essential factoL Other 
judges would read the first clause as necessarily modified by the 
second. For them, the first clause essentially "incorporates" the 
warrants clause so that all searches without a warrant are un-
reasonable-except in those cases where absolute necessity may 
preclude the officer from obtaining a warrant in advance of the 
search. The decisions of the Supreme Court over the last twenty 
years have seemingly moved back and forth from one position to 
the other. See Able v. United States, 362 U.S. 21, 235 (1959) listing 
a series of cases which the Court itself recognizes "cannot be sat-
isfactorily reconciled." 
Recent decisions indicate that the present Court clearly takes 
a position that emphasizes the warrant requirement. While the 
use of a warrant is not viewed as absolutely essential, the Court 
does treat the warrant requirement as the basic criterion of 
reasonableness, and searches upheld without a warrant are viewed 
as based on exceptions to the general rule. This point has been 
made in several recent cases. Typical is the statement in Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967): 
This Court has never sustained a search upon the sole 
grounds that the officers reasonably expected to find evidence 
of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activi-
ties to the least intrusive means consistent with that end. 
Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful 
"notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable 
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cause, Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33, for the Con-
stitution requires that the deliberate, impartial judgment of 
a judicial officer ... be interposed between the citizen and 
the police .... " Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
481-82. "Over and again this Court has emphasized that the 
mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to 
judicial processes," United States v. jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 
and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only 
to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions [389 U.S. at 357]. 
A similar sentiment was expressed in the recent Terry case, 
where the Court carefully distinguished the issue of stop-and-
frisk from that involving "police conduct subject to the warrant 
clause of the Fourth Amendment." In particular, the Court noted 
that it was not retreating from its "holdings that the police must, 
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches 
through the warrant procedure ... , or that in most instances 
failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be 
excused by exigent circumstances." See Chapter l. See also Cam-
ara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). 
Despite the strong language of these cases, it should be re-
membered that the well-delineated exceptions referred to in Katz 
have not always been construed narrowly. See e.g., United States 
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), Harris v. United States, 331 
U.S. 145 (1947). Also, in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), 
decided only one term before Katz and Terry, a majority opinion 
again emphasized the distinction between the "reasonableness 
clause" and the "warrants clause," stating: 
It is no answer to say that the police could have obtained 
a warrant, for "[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reason-
able to procure a search warrant, but whether the search 
was reasonable." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 
66." 
N E E D F 0 R W A R R A N T / 157 
B. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: Search of Moving 
Vehicles. 
In Carrol v. United States) 267 U.S. 132 (1925), prohibition 
agents, having probable cause to believe that an automobile 
traveling on the highway was carrying liquor, stopped the car, 
searched it, and found and seized the liquor. Provisions of the 
National Prohibition Act, as construed by the Court, authorized 
warrantless searches of moving vehicles. The Court found this 
authorization reasonable in light of ( 1) the historical practice, 
recognized at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amend-
ment, of custom searches of vessels on probable cause without 
a warrant, and (2) the practical problems of law enforcement 
resulting from the fact that vehicles could easily move on and 
disappear before a warrant was obtained. In Brinegar v. United 
States) 338 U.S. 160 (1949)., the Court extended Carrol to a war-
rantless search of a moving vehicle in a situation where no 
statute authorized the search. 
Brinegar and Carrol have· been followed by a long line of 
lower court opinions, including several recent cases. See) e.g.) 
United States v. Freeman, 382 F.2d 272 (6th Cir., 1967); Bailey 
v. United States) 386 F.2d 1 (5th Cir., 1967). The Supreme Court 
itself has reemphasized the basic rationale of Carrol and Brinegar 
by refusing to apply that doctrine to a vehicle that is immobil-
ized. See Preston v. United States, discussed infra Section VII (G). 
C. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: Response to an 
Emergency Situation. 
Courts have long recognized the right of officers to break into 
a dwelling in order to protect persons therein and to incidentally 
seize such contraband as was open to view. See generally johnson 
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) and 1\/lcDonald v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, recognizing a special "exigencies 
of the situation" exception. Thus officers who were keeping a house 
under surveillance were justified in making a warrantless entry 
when a fire broke out inside the house, and they could properly 
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observe contraband within the house. People v. Gatti) 285 
N.Y.S.2d 437 (App. Div., 1967). See also State v. Puryear) 227 
A.2d 139 (N.J. App., 1967) (breaking into apartment from which 
noxious gases were escaping); Webster v. State) 201 So.2d 789 
(Fla. App., 1967); Patrick v. State) 227 A.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. Del., 
1967). 
In Warden v. Hayden) 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the "exigent cir-
cumstances" doctrine was applied to a case of "hot pursuit." The 
relevant facts are succinctly stated in the Court's opinion: 
About 8 a.m. on March 17, 1962, an armed robber entered 
the business premises of the Diamond Cab Company in 
Baltimore, Maryland. He took some $363 and ran. Two cab 
drivers in the vicinity, attracted by shouts of "Holdup," 
followed the man to 2111 Cocoa Lane. One driver notified 
the company dispatcher by radio that the man was a Negro 
about 5'8" tall, wearing a light cap and dark jacket, and that 
he had entered the house ·on Cocoa Lane. The dispatcher 
relayed the information to police who were proceeding to 
the scene of the robbery. Within minutes, police arrived at 
the house in a number of patrol cars. An officer knocked 
and announced their presence. Mrs. Hayden answered, and 
the officers told her they believed that a robber had entered 
the house, and asked to search the house. She offered no 
objection. 
The officers spread out through the first and second floors 
and the cellar in search of the robber. Hayden was found 
in an upstairs bedroom feigning sleep. He was arrested when 
the officers on the first floor and in the cellar reported that 
no other man was in the house. Meanwhile an officer was 
attracted to an adjoining bathroom by the noise of running 
water, and discovered a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank; 
another officer who, according to the District Court, "was 
searching the cellar for a man or the money" found a jacket 
and trousers of the type the fleeing man was said to have 
worn in a washing machine. A clip of ammunition for the 
pistol and a cap were found under the mattress of Hayden's 
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bed, and ammunition for the shotgun was found in a bureau 
drawer in Hayden's room. All these items of evidence were 
introduced against respondent at his trial [387 U.S. at 297-98]. 
The court below suggested that the search could be sustained 
as incident to an arrest. The Court majority, however, preferred 
to rely on the emergency situation that necessitated the entry: 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither the 
entry without warrant to search for the robber, nor the search 
for him without warrant was invalid. Under the circum-
stances of this case, "the exigencies of the situation made 
that course imperative." McDonald v. United States> 335 U.S. 
451, 456. The police were informed that an armed robbery 
had taken place, and that the suspect had entered 2111 Cocoa 
Lane less than five minutes before they reached it. They acted 
reasonably when they entered the house and began to search 
for a man of the description they had been given and for 
weapons which he had used in the robbery or might use 
against them. The Fourth Amendment does not require 
police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to 
do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of 
others. Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search 
of the house for persons and weapons could have insured 
that Hayden was the only man present and that the police 
had control of all weapons which could be used against them 
or to effect an escape. 
Wf do not rely upon Harris v. United States> supra> in 
sustaining the validity of the search. The principal issue in 
Harris was whether the search there could properly be re-
garded as incident to the lawful arrest since Harris was in 
custody before the search was made and the evidence seized. 
Here, the seizures occurred prior to or immediately contem-
poraneous with Hayden's arrest, as part of an effort to find 
a suspected felon, armed, within the house into which he 
had run only minutes before the police arrived. The permis-
sible scope of search must, therefore, at the least, be as broad as 
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may reasonably be necessary to prevent the dangers that the 
suspect at large in the house may resist or escape. 
It is argued that, while the weapons, ammunition, and 
cap may have been seized in the course of a search for 
weapons, the officer who seized the clothing was searching 
neither for the suspect nor for weapons when he looked into 
the washing machine in which he found the clothing. But 
even if we assume, although we do not decide, that the 
exigent circumstances in this case made lawful a search 
without warrant only for the suspect or his weapons, it 
cannot be said on this record that the officer who found the 
clothes in the washing machine was not searching for 
weapons. He testified that he was searching for the man or 
the money, but his failure to state explicitly that he was 
searching for weapons, in the absence of a specific question 
to that effect, can hardly be accorded controlling weight. He 
knew that the robber was armed and he did not know that 
some weapons had been found at the time he opened the 
machine. In these circumstimces the inference that he was in 
fact also looking for weapons is fully justified [387 U.S. 298-
300]. 
The exact scope of the "exigent circumstances" doctrine 
announced in Hayden is not entirely clear. A recent California 
decision suggests both its appropriate application and its limita-
tions. In People v. Kampmann, 65 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App., 1968), 
two officers entered a house without a warrant in response to 
neighborhood complaints of screaming and other circumstances 
that suggested a possible kidnapping. The house was empty when 
the officers entered. Finding phonograph records on the floor, 
bottles knocked over, and papers scattered, they decided to search 
all the rooms and closets to determine whether someone might 
not have been killed. After finding nothing, one of the officers 
went to the kitchen to use the telephone. His partner noticed an 
open coffee can on a table near the phone. It contained hypo-
dermic needles, syringes and marijuana. This discovery was re-
ported to headquarters and more officers were dispatched to make 
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a further investigation. Meanwhile, the officers managed to find 
the owner in a local garage, and he explained that the commotion 
that had disturbed the neighbors was simply a very noisy family 
dispute. The officers were satisfied with this explanation, but 
arrested the owner on the narcotics charge. Subsequently, other 
officers returned to the house and conducted a second, more 
thorough search without a warrant. The second search produced 
more marijuana. The court found that the first search was 
valid under Warden v. Hayden) but not the second: 
Appellant's first contention is that although the entry 
originally made by the officers was lawful, as soon as the 
first can of marijuana was discovered, they should have posted 
a guard upon it and procured a search warrant before making 
a seizure. (Cf. Trupiano v. United States (1948) 334 U.S. 699, 
overruled in United States v. Rabinowitz (1950) 339 U.S. 56). 
It is true that such a procedure was followed in People v. 
Roberts (1956) 47 Cal.2d 374, 303 P.2d 721, where police 
officers entered premises without a warrant when, approach-
ing to investigate a burglary, they heard sounds like moans 
of distress inside the apartment. While searching for someone 
in distress they noticed a stolen radio in the kitchen. Rather 
than seizing the radio immediately they procured a search 
warrant. The conviction which was founded upon the seized 
radio was affirmed. However, the Roberts case is not a holding 
that the officers were required to obtain a warrant in that 
situation. Appellant relies upon United States v. Scott 
(D.C. 1957) 149 F.Supp. 837, in which officers lawfully en-
tered a robbery suspect's apartment, saw in plain sight items 
taken in the robbery, and seized those items without a search 
warrant. The court held that once the officers found the 
stolen property there was no urgency requiring an immediate 
seizure. Thus, since they failed to go and get a search warrant, 
the seizure was held to be illegal and the evidence produced 
thereby was inadmissible. A contrary result has been reached 
by the United States Supreme Court in Warden Md. Peniten-
tiary v. Hayden (1967) 387 U.S. 294, in which police officers 
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pursued a robber into a house and there made an extensive 
search which produced several items of evidence. The court 
held that the entry in hot pursuit was lawful, and thereupon 
sustained the admission of evidence which was discovered in 
a search reasonably connected with the hot pursuit even 
though in the circumstances there presented the search was 
held not to have been incident to the arrest. 
Similar results have been reached in several California 
cases. In both People v. Smith ( 1966) 63 Cal.2d 779, 48 Cal.-
Rptr. 382, 409 P.2d 222 and People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 
Cal.2d 690, 706, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365 (vacated on 
other grounds, 388 U.S. 263) an entry without a warrant 
was held to have been justified by hot pursuit or other 
pressing emergency, and evidence seized in the ensuing 
search was held to be admissible. In neither case was the 
search incident to an arrest. ... 
Appellant's final contention is that even granting the ad-
missibility of the can of marijuana fortuitously seen by the 
first two officers the other evidence developed in the course 
of the later search should have been excluded. The Attorney 
General contends that the later discoveries were admissible as 
the incidental by-products of a continuing investigation of 
the supposed kidnapping, but the record compels a contrary 
view. According to the uncontradicted testimony of one of 
the officers, the further search may have begun before Kamp-
mann was brought to the house but it was certainly continued 
thereafter, when the parents of the "kidnapped" girl had 
already been interviewed, and appellant had been taken 
away to jail; there was then no longer any concern with the 
supposed kidnapping. Clearly this continued searching had 
only one purpose: the development of evidence for a nar-
cotics prosecution. The sequence of events related in the 
testimony makes it appear highly likely, if not absolutely 
certain, that all or a major part of the additional evidence 
was discovered after concern with the supposed kidnapping 
had ended. That phase of the search was unlawful and the 
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evidence developed thereby should have been excluded [65 
Cal.Rptr. at 801-802]. 
D. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: The Threatened 
Destruction of Evidence. 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 7 57 ( 1966), recognizes still 
another "exigent circumstance" that justifies a search without a 
warrant. In Schmerber the Court upheld the administration of 
a blood test to a defendant who had been arrested for "drunk 
driving." The Court treated the withdrawal of blood (admin-
istered by a physician) as a form of search, but concluded that 
the officer who directed that the test be given acted appropriately 
even though he had not first obtained a warrant. The Court 
stressed the general importance of the warrant requirement, 
especially as it applied to the invasion of the body in search of 
evidence. Nevertheless, it concluded that: "The officer ... might 
reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emer-
gency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under 
the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence." Pres-
ton v. United States) 376 U.S. 364, 367. It noted that the "per-
centage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after 
drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the 
system." Moreover, in the Schmerber case, time had to be spent 
after the arrest in first taking the defendant to the hospital and 
then investigating the scene of the accident. Under such circum-
stances, "there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure 
a warrant," 384 U.S. at 770-71. 
VII. Searches Incident to an Arrest. 
A. Background. 
Without doubt, the most significant exception to the warrant 
requirement is the search incident to the arrest. Far more 
searches are sustained on this basis than upon actual search 
warrants. Court decisions defining the scope of the permissible 
search incident to the arrest are not entirely consistent. The 
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cases of Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) and United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) have been described by 
the Court as setting "by far the most permissive limits upon 
searches incidental to lawful arrests." A bel v. United States, 362 
U.S. 217, 235 (1960). In Harris, five officers possessing arrest 
warrants entered a four-room apartment and arrested the de-
fendant in the living room. They then undertook a five-hour 
search of all four rooms, with the object initially of finding 
canceled checks used in effecting a forgery. During the search 
they came across various "draft cards" which were later intro-
duced in defendant's trial for violation of the Selective Service 
laws. The Court in sustaining the search stressed that it was not 
a "general exploration" but had been aimed at finding specific 
evidence relating to the charge for which Harris had been arrested 
(331 U.S. at 153). In Rabinowitz, supra, the Court upheld the 
search, incident to defendant's arrest, of desks, file cabinets and 
other equipment in his one-room office. The officers had obtained 
an arrest warrant, and obviously entered the office with the intent 
to conduct a search. (They were accompanied by two stamp 
experts who would help in identifying various forged overprint 
stamps possessed by the defendant. The Court acknowledged 
that the officers had ample time to obtain a search warrant, but 
found that that factor could not be controlling. They stressed 
that the premises searched were "under the control of the person 
arrested." 
Recent decisions have suggested a somewhat narrower basis 
for searches incident to an arrest. For example, in Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Court suggested that the 
recognition of a warrantless search incident to an arrest rested 
on two factors: 
First, there may be more immediate danger of concealed 
weapons or of destruction of evidence under the direct con-
trol of the accused . . . ; second, once a search of the arrested 
persons for ~eapons is permitted, it would be both im-
practical and unnecessary to enforcement of the Fourth 
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Amendment's purpose to attempt to confine the search to 
these objects alone [384 U.S. at 757]. 
As noted in Section F, infra) such statements have lead some lower 
courts to suggest the Supreme Court today might not accept 
searches incident to arrests pushed to the extremes of Harris 
and Rabinowitz. 
B. Factors Determining the Validity of a Search Incident to 
Lawful Arrest. 
Lower courts have stressed various factors in determining the 
validity of a search incident to an arrest. These include (1) the 
territorial range of the search; (2) the timing of the search as it 
relates to the arrest; (3) the scope and intensity of the search; 
(4) the relation of the search to the grounds for arrest; and (5) 
the possible reliance on an arrest as a pretext to search. See State 
v. Chinn, 373 P.2d 392 (Ore. Sup. Ct., 1962); People v. Cruz, 
395 P.2d 889 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 1960). Several of these factors have 
also been stressed in Supreme Court opinions. See) e.g.) Agnello 
v. United States) 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Preston v. United States) 376 
U.S. 364 (1964); Cooper v. California) 386 U.S. 58 (1967). Recent 
cases further develop their significance. 
C. Territorial Range of the Search. 
In Agnello v. United States) 269 U.S. 20 (1925), the Supreme 
Court emphasized that the right to search incident to an arrest 
extends only to "the place" of arrest. The Court held invalid the 
search of Agnello's house located several blocks from the place of 
his arrest. The scope of the Agnello ruling has been considered in 
several recent cases where the defendant was arrested within the 
immediate vicinity of his residence. In People v. Bennet) 280 
N.Y.S.2d 258 (App. Div., 1967), the Court held that a search of 
defendant's hotel room was not incident to an arrest made in a 
hotel hallway on the same floor as the room. A similar position 
was taken in People. v. Henry) 423 P.2d 557 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 1967) 
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(arrest made on sidewalk 10-12 feet from hotel entrance) and 
Mcilvaine v. Middlebrooks, 265 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. La., 1967) 
(arrest a half block away from residence). In People v. Marquez, 
66 Cal. Rptr. 615 (Ct. App., 1968), on the other hand, the court 
upheld the search of a storage shed as incidental to an arrest 
made immediately in front of it. The court emphasized that just 
prior to the arrest the officers had seen the defendants carry 
packages resembling marijuana "bricks" into the shed, and the 
object of the search was "to obtain evidence of the very offense 
which the officers reasonably believed was being committed in 
their immediate presence." It concluded that "the fact that the 
arrestee was, at the moment of arrest, outside the four walls of 
the shed, does not, by itself, preclude a search of the shed." [66 
Cal. Rptr. at 620]. 
D. The Timing of the Search. 
It is generally stated that the search must be contemporaneous 
with the arrest. See People v. Cruz, supra. The Supreme Court 
has held that the search of an automobile need not immediately 
follow an arrest, see Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 1967 (dis-
cussed infra Section H.), but that case involved special circum-
stances not applicable to the search of a residence. However, an 
approach similar to that of Cooper has been employed to justify 
a subsequent search (at the jail) of bags carried by the defendant 
at the time of his arrest. See Hinton v. State, 436 P.2d 223 (Nev. 
1967). Courts have also generally recognized the search and 
seizure of articles of clothing taken from the defendant at the 
time of imprisonment. See State v. Herring, 421 P.2d 767 (N.M. 
Sup. Ct., 1966); Arabia v. State, 421 P.2d 952 (Nev. Sup. Ct., 
1966). See also State v. Dill, 151 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. Sup. Ct., 
1967). 
Two recent cases have held that the arrest need not preceed 
the search so long as (I) the search and arrest are contemporaneous 
and (2) the officer had probable cause to arrest at the time he made 
the search. See Commonwealth v. Friel, 234 A.2d 22 (Pa. Super. 
Ct., 1967) (searc11 of automobile); People v. Pankin, 143 N.W.2d 
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806 (Mich. Ct. App., 1966) (search of room). In sustaining this 
position, the Michigan Court relied heavily on the following 
discussion from an earlier California case: 
[T]he search of defendant's person may be justified only 
if he was committing or attempting to commit an offense in 
the officer's presence ... or the officer had reasonable cause 
to believe he had committed a felony .... In such circum-
stances, however, it has been held that it is not significant 
whether the search preceeds or follows the arrest. Thus, if 
the officer is entitled to make an arrest on the basis of in-
formation available to him before he searches, and as an 
incident to the arrest is entitled to make a reasonable search 
of the person arrested, and the place where he is arrested) 
there is nothing unreasonable in his conduct if he makes the 
search before instead of after the arrest. In fact, if the person 
searched is innocent and the search convinces the officer that 
his reasonable belief to the contrary is erroneous, it is to the 
advantage of the person searched not to be arrested. On the 
other hand, if he is not innocent or the search does not 
establish his innocence, the security of his person, house, 
papers, or effects suffers no more from a search preceding his 
arrest than it would from the same search following it [143 
N.W.2d at 810-811, quoting People v. Simon1 290 P.2d 531, 
533 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 1955) But cf. Warden v. Hayden 1 387 
u.s. 294, 299 (1967)]. 
E. The Relation of the Search to the Grounds for Arrest. 
The relationship of the search to the arrest has been a point 
of particular emphasis in the various automobile-search cases 
discussed infra) Section H. However, recent cases dealing with 
the searches of persons and residences have also stressed this 
factor. The courts have insisted that the search incident to an 
arrest be for evidence relating to the crime for which the arrest 
was made. The officers cannot arrest for one crime and proceed 
to search for another. jack v. United States, 387 F.2d 471 (9th 
Cir., 1967). 
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In Handley v. State, 430 P.2d 830 (Okla. Cr., 1967), the 
Court rejected an intensive search of a house which produced 
narcotics buried in a jar under the house as not incident to a 
burglary arrest. The Court placed particular emphasis on the 
fact that two narcotics agents had accompanied sheriff's deputies 
in making the burglary arrest. In People v. Baca, 62 Cal. Rptr. 
182 (Ct. App., 1967), the Court held that the arrest of defendant 
as a fugitive did not authorize a search of the bathroom since no 
evidence of the crime (unlawful flight) could have been found 
there. Again the arrest was made by narcotics agents who dis-
covered heroin in the search. On the other side, in State v. Bullock, 
431 P.2d 195 (Wash. Sup. Ct., 1967), the court upheld the search 
of defendant's apartment as incident to an arrest for assault. In 
that case, however, the officers were seeking a specific credit card 
which would have been evidence in the assault case. Of course, 
once the search was directed at evidence related to the arrest, 
the officers were entitled to seize contraband (marijuana) found 
in the course of the search. See also Harris v. United States,. 331 
u.s. 145 (1947). 
The relationship between the search and the grounds for the 
arrest has seemed to cause the courts far less concern where only 
a search of the person is involved. Thus several cases have upheld 
complete searches of the person incident to arrest for public 
intoxication. See, e.g., Chambler v. State, 416 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. 
Sup. Ct., 1967); Farmer v. State, 208 So.2d 266 (Fla. Ct. App., 
1968); Lofton v. Warden, 431 P.2d 981 (Nev. Sup. Ct., 1967). 
In Lofton, sujJra, the officers testified that they believed the 
defendant might have possessed a weapon since he insisted on 
keeping his left hand in his pocket. (The search produced mari-
juana.) In Chambler, the court also identified the search as one 
for weapons, although it is not clear whether the officers would 
have met the standard ~nnounced in Terry v. Ohio, supra Chapter 
1, as justifying a frisk-whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety 
or that of others was in danger. In Farmer, however, the officer 
opened up a matchbox found in defendant's possession, an act 
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which would have been totally unnecessary in a weapons search. 
The matchbox contained marijuana and the Court held it was 
properly seized in a search incidental to the arrest. A contrary 
position is suggested by State v. johnson, 427 P.2d 705 (Wash. 
Sup. Ct., 1967). 
F. Arrests Made as a Pretext to a Search. 
Several recent decisions have rejected as unreasonable searches 
that followed arrests manipulated for the very purpose of making 
such searches. See, e.g., Handley v. State, 430 P.2d 830 (Okla. 
Cr., 1967); Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535 (1st Cir., 
1968); United States v. ]ames, 378 F.2d 88 (6th Cir., 1967); United 
States v. Kleefield, 275 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y., 1967). The basic 
rationale of these cases is well summarized in Handley: 
We therefore conclude that the proper test of a reasonable 
search and seizure is based upon the entire factual situation. 
Was the search close both in time and space to the arrest? 
Furthermore, was the intensity of the search commensurate 
both with the crime and what was known of the criminal? 
Finally, there is the question of the causal relationship be-
tween the arrest and the search. In each case, the trial judge 
must determine whether the officers went to the place to 
make a lawful arrest, and in making it, looked for evidence 
lawfully subject to seizure, or whether the officers used a pre-
tended arrest for one offense as a "Trojan Horse" in order 
to obtain entry, only to prosecute for some greater crime after 
finding sufficient evidence to justify their belief in greater 
crt me. 
The first kind of search is incidental to an arrest and is 
lawful-the second is a fishing expedition, and is as odious 
as the general warrant of antiquity [430 P.2d at 834]. 
Aside from the factors mentioned in Handley, the courts have 
also emphasized the failure to obtain a warrant when one could 
readily have been had. Thus in Niro the court noted: 
We cannot accept the government's contention that this was 
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not a case "where there was clear evidence of probable cause 
to make the arrests [substantially] prior to the time they 
were made." Quite to the contrary, the arresting officer testi-
fied as follows. 
Q. "Now, you had had all of the information that was 
available to you with regard to this arrest, and with re-
gard to this search and seizure, on the evening of Sep-
tember 19th had you not?" 
A. "Yes, sir." 
No contradiction is to be found. Either the officers had had 
probable cause to make the arrests for over twelve hours 
(which we believe they did) or they never had it. 
In the light of the unexplained neglect to obtain a warrant, 
this case fits squarely within Trupiano v. United States, 1948, 
334 u.s. 699 .... 
[Admittedly] . . . two years [after Trupiano J the Court 
decided United States v. Rabinowitz, 1950, 339 U.S. 56, [in 
which it was said that the test] was the reasonableness of the 
search viewed "under all the circumstances." The Court 
stated: 
"To the extent that Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 
699, requires a search warrant solely upon the basis of the 
practicability of procuring it rather than upon the reason-
ableness of the search after a lawful arrest, that case is 
overruled. The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable 
to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was 
reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts 
and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case." 339 
U.S. at 66. (Emphasis ours.) 
While the Court said that the "practicability of procuring 
a search warrant" was no longer determinative, and that to 
that extent Trupiano was overruled, it did not say that such 
omission was not a circumstance to be considered. Although 
it itemized the particular circumstances it found relevant, 
it did so only in the context of determining whether there 
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was probable cause, not to explain the departure from Trupi-
ano. Unfortunately, it failed to provide any standard for 
determining what was overall reasonableness. After nearly 
twenty years, the lower courts still lack illumination .... 
The present case does not fit Rabinowitz. It substantially 
fits Trupiano. Accordingly, the question comes whether Tru-
piano stands today entirely abandoned. While we cannot 
speak with certainty, we think it does not. We find it note-
worthy that the Court, while not mentioning Trupiano, con-
tinues to cite the similar case of McDonald v. United States, 
with approval. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, n. 
19; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529. The 
Court continues to stress the desirability of obtaining a 
search warrant when it is reasonably practicable to do 
so. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, supra. If no penalty 
will ever attach to a failure to seek a warrant, as distinguished 
from the officers making their own, correct, determination of 
probable cause, warrants will never be sought, at least when 
the search is expected to be accompanied by an arrest. 
We think it proper to say that while the failure to obtain 
a warrant when one could readily have been had is not of 
necessity fatal to a search or seizure concomitant with an 
arrest the nature of which had been fully anticipated, it will 
be fatal unless there are at least some countervailing factors. 
We need not define such circumstances. In the case at bar we 
find none. We hold that the government cannot rely upon an 
expected arrest to seize stolen goods, the presence of which it 
long had probable cause to know of, simply to avoid the in-
convenience of obtaining a search warrant. Cf. United States 
v. ]ames, 6 Cir., 1967, 378 F.2d 88; United States v. Harris, 
6 Cir., 1963, 321 F.2d 739, 741 and cases there collected. 
Proceeding without a warrant is not to be justified, as the 
government suggests here, by the fact that by the time the 
officers act, dispatch is necessary to avoid flight or injury to 
person or property. Haste does not become necessary in the 
present sense if the need for it has been brought about by 
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deliberate and unreasonable delay. This would allow the 
exception to swallow the principle [388 F.2d at 538-40]. 
In james) supra) the Court not only emphasized the same point, 
but cited the agents' employment of an arrest warrant as evidence 
that a search warrant might have been obtained: 
Since the agents had ample time to secure a warrant for 
her arrest, they obviously had time to secure a search warrant 
to search her residence, but did not obtain one. The offense 
for which the arrest warrant was issued took place on June 3, 
1963. The arrest was not made until September 26, 1963, on a 
warrant obtained only one or two days prior thereto. No 
explanation has been offered as to why the agents waited for 
more than three and one-half months after the offense had 
been committed, to obtain the arrest warrant. Appellant 
James had been living in the searched apartment with 
Sanders Mallory, Jr., since the middle of 1962. The agents 
had information that James and Mallory had been using 
their residence (first Tuxedo Street, then the apartment on 
Elmhurst Street) as their place of business for the distribu-
tion of narcotics, from the latter part of 1961 up until the 
date of the arrest. 
The Government contends, however, that the only reliable 
information which it had was concerning violations which 
took place at the apartment on June 3, 1963 and July 9, 1963, 
and this information was too remote in time from September 
26, 1963 to obtain a search warrant. But the fact is that the 
narcotics agents made no attempt to secure a search warrant. 
The testimony of Agent Miller was that the question of 
whether there was sufficient evidence to obtain a search war-
rant did not arise and he made no determination as to the 
need for it. District Supervisor Ellis testified that there was 
no discussion about obtaining a search warrant .... 
Taking into account all of the admitted facts and circum-
stances of the case, including the large aggregation of agents 
and police officers, it seems to us that the agents and officers 
were interested in something more than merely making an 
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arrest. It is clear that their primary purpose was to make a 
general exploratory search of the apartment, with the hope 
of finding narcotics. This search, in our judgment, was un-
reasonable and violated the rights of Appellant James under 
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. [378 U.S. at 
90-91]. 
Compare United States v. Costello, 381 F.2d 698 (2nd Cir., 1967) 
(holding that the failure to obtain a search warrant in addition 
to the arrest warrant did not in itself establish a primary motiva-
tion of using the arrest as a basis for a search); Spinell v. United 
States, 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir., 1967) (holding that delayed execu-
tion of the arrest does not necessarily establish that the arrest 
was improperly employed to establish a search incident thereto). 
See also United States v. Weaver, 384 F.2d 879 (4th Cir., 1967). 
G. Search of the Automobile and/or the Person Incident 
to a Traffic Arrest. 
Recent cases have reaffirmed that violation of a traffic ordinance 
does not, in itself, justify a search of the offender's automobile. 
See Winkle v. Kropp, 279 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. Mich., 1968); 
State v. Young, 425 S.W.2d 177 (Mo., 1968). Courts have expressed 
particular concern over the potential use of the traffic arrest as 
a pretext to search a car for evidence of other offenses. See 
Sedacca v. State, 236 A.2d 309 (Md. Ct. App., 1967); Riddle-
hoover v. State, 198 S.2d 651 (Fla. Ct. App., 1967); Amador 
Gonzales v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir., 1968). Search 
of an automobile has been upheld, however, where observations 
by the police after the traffic stop suggest that the car might be 
stolen. Thus a search has been upheld where the driver was 
unable to produce a driver's license, identification or registration 
certificate, Taylor v. State, 421 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App., 
1967); where the car had no plates, title certificate was not in 
driver's name and was not signed, and the driver had no license, 
People v. Brown, 221 N.E.2d 772 (Ill. Sup. Ct., 1967); where the 
defendant "kept getting in front" of the officer so as to keep 
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him from approaching the car, Adair v. State, 427 S.W.2d 67 
(Tex. Ct. of Crim. App., 1968); but not where defendant merely 
acted "nervous" but was able to produce a valid license and 
registration, People v. Reed, 227 N.E.2d 69 (Ill. Sup. Ct., 1967). 
See also State v. Boykin, 232 A.2d 141 (N.J. Sup. Ct., 1967); 
Edmond v. State, 208 So.2d 135 (Fla. App., 1968); Winkle v. 
Kropp, supra. But see Liming v. State, 417 S.W.2d 769 (Tenn. 
Sup. Ct., 1967). 
Recent cases have divided on the officer's authority to search 
the driver's person incident to a traffic arrest. People v. Marsh, 
228 N.E.2d 783 (N.Y. Ct. App., 1967) and State v. Campbell, 
235 A.2d 235 (N.J. Sup. Ct., 1967) suggest that, at most, the 
officer can only make a search for weapons if he fears the driver is 
armed. Sumrall v. United States, 382 F.2d 651 (lOth Cir., 1967) 
permits a search of the person going far beyond a frisk for 
weapons. 
H. The Search of an Automobile Incident to a Non-Traffic 
Arrest. 
In Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), the Court 
struck down the search of an automobile made after the defendants 
were arrested and jailed. The defendants there were arrested on 
vagrancy charges while seated in their automobile. The vehicle 
was subsequently taken into police custody to remove it from 
the street and was searched shortly thereafter. In finding the 
search illegal, the Court assumed arguendo that a search might 
initially have been made at the time of the arrest. It found, 
however, that the search of the car after the men were taken 
into custody and the car impounded was an entirely different 
matter. "At this point," it noted, "there was no danger that any 
of the men arrested could have used any weapons in the car 
or could have destroyed any evidence of a crime." The Court 
concluded that the search was "too remote in time or place to 
have been made as incidental to the arrest." 373 U.S. at 368. 
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In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), the Court dis-
tinguished Preston and upheld a search made one week after the 
arrest. The defendant here had been arrested on a narcotics 
charge and his car impounded pursuant to a special state law. 
That law provided that a vehicle involved in the illegal handling 
of narcotics was to be held as evidence until a forfeiture had been 
declared or a release ordered. The Court held that this factor 
strongly contributed to the justification of the subsequent search. 
It emphasized that, unlike this case, the police custody of the car 
in Preston had been totally unrelated to the vagrancy arrest. 
It also noted that the search here was "closely related to the reason 
the defendant was arrested." The Court did not classify the 
search as incident to the arrest, but simply noted that it was 
a "reasonable" search even though no warrant was obtained. 
In particular, it stated that "[i]t would be unreasonable to hold 
that the police, having to retain the car in their garage for 
[four months] ... , had no right, even for their own protection, 
to search it." 
The relationship of Preston and Cooper is not entirely clear. 
The Court in Cooper clearly sought to distinguish Preston but 
did so on several grounds. A dissenting opinion of four justices 
suggested that Cooper might constitute a sub silentio overruling 
of Preston. On the other hand, the Court's opinion in Cooper was 
written by Justice Black, who also authored the Preston opinion. 
Many lower court opinions have avoided the difficulty of 
reconciling Preston and Cooper by finding that searches made 
shortly after the arrest, although not in the same place, were 
sufficiently contemporaneous to meet the requirements of Preston. 
See, e.g., United States v. Dento, 382 F.2d 361 (3rd Cir., 1967) 
(car moved to police station from busy highway and searched 
there 20 minutes after the arrest); U.S. ex rel Spero v. McKendrick, 
266 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y., 1967) (car properly removed to the 
police station, five minutes away, in order to avoid traffic conges-
tion and question the occupants); United States ex rel Foose v. 
Rundle, 269 F. Supp. 1017 (E.D. Pa., 1967) (search at station, two 
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blocks and 10 minutes away from point of arrest, not "too re-
mote"); Terrel v. State, 239 A.2d 128 (Md. Ct. App., 1968) (car 
properly removed % miles to police station where better light 
would facilitate search). Several cases, in particular, have accepted 
searches as incident to an arrest where the automobile was first 
removed to a nearby police station in order to avoid a crowd. 
See} e.g.} People v. Webb, 424 P.2d 342 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 1967); 
United States v. Evans, 385 F.2d 824 (7th Cir., 1967); Morris v. 
Boles, 386 F.2d 395 (4th Cir., 1967). Most of these cases also 
stressed the close relation between the purpose of the search and 
the crime for which the defendant was arrested. See} e.g.} United 
States v. Dento} supra}· State v. Omo, 428 P.2d 768 (Kans. Sup. 
Ct., 1967). In fact, where the search was not aimed at finding 
evidence related to such crime, it has been found invalid even 
though conducted shortly after the arrest at a nearby police station. 
See Barnett v. United States, 384 F.2d 848 (5th Cir., 1967). 
Courts relying on Cooper generally have limited its application 
to the searches of vehicles that were impounded originally as 
instruments of the crime for which the arrest was made. Under 
this approach, the entire automobile is viewed as originally 
"seized" when the police take the defendant into custody. Any 
subsequent search is considered merely as a reexamination of an 
item already taken incident to an arrest. See Weaver v. Lane, 382 
F.2d 251 (7th Cir., 1967) (seizure of car as evidence of child 
molestation where blood on seat); State v. McCoy, 437 P.2d 734 
(Ore. Sup. Ct., 1968) (seizure of car as instrument of rape); State 
v. Hoy, 430 P.2d 275 (Kans. Sup. Ct. 1967) (seizure of car 
allegedly involved in shooting incident). See also Abrams v. State, 
154 S.E.2d 443 (Ga. Sup. Ct., 1967). Several cases have extended 
this doctrine to the seizure and search of automobiles not located 
at the point of arrest. See United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 
1013 (2d Cir., 1967) (alternative ground: car located in driveway 
next to house in which the arrest was made); Stewart v. People, 
426 P.2d 545 (Colo. Sup. Ct., 1967) (car located near scene of 
arrest where defendant was burglarizing a building, but was not 
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seized until after defendant was searched at the station and key 
to the car was found); Lockett v. United States, 390 F.2d 168 (9th 
Cir., 1968) (car was seized in San Francisco airport parking lot 
after defendant's confederate, arrested in Los Angeles, informed 
police that stolen securities were located in the car). These 
decisions go beyond Cooper in the sense that not even the original 
seizure of the automobile was incident to the arrest. They ap-
parently rely on the premise that the entire automobile may be 
seized by the officer without a warrant in much the same fashion 
as he seizes contraband open to view. 
I. The Legality of the Arrest. 
Of course a search will be sustained only if incidental to a 
valid arrest. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1961). 
Recent decisions suggest two trends in the analysis of the validity 
of an arrest. First, the validity of arrests for vagrancy have come 
under attack-especially where there is some suggestion that the 
arrest was a pretext to search (see Section F, supra). In Fenster 
v. Leary, 229 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. Ct. App., 1967), the New York 
Court of Appeals struck down the vagrancy offense as imposing 
criminal liability on a harmless status. In Green v. United States, 
386 F.2d 953 (1Oth Cir., 1967), the Court condemned the improper 
use of vagrancy as a basis for detaining "suspicious characters." 
The Court there stated: 
We agree with the contentions of appellants ... that their 
original arrests as vagrants were not a lawful exercise of 
police power, that the searches of their persons were not 
justified as incidents to lawful arrest, and that as a con-
sequence the money order found upon the person of Watkins 
was improperly admitted in evidence. Although the hour-
long surveillance of appellants certainly pointed the finger 
of suspicion at their individual and concerted activity still 
neither of the appellants committed an unlawful act observed 
by the officers that can support a lawful arrest. Under Okla-
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homa law a city police officer is a state officer, City of Lawton 
v. Harkins, 34 Okl. 545, 126 P. 727, 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 69, and 
may arrest without warrant when a public offense is com-
mitted in his presence or when a felony has been committed 
and reasonable cause exists to believe the person arrested 
has committed it. Title 22, 0KL.STAT. § 196. Neither of these 
statutory authorities is applicable to the arrests of Watkins 
or James Green. Nor can the existence of an Oklahoma City 
vagrancy ordinance in use so as to constitute a tool of avoid-
ance or shortcut to the basic requirements of due process in 
the administration of justice. And this fundamental rule 
exists regardless of the ultimate determination of the existent 
suggestion attacking the constitutionality of particular statutes 
making vagrancy a crime of status. See Fenster v. Leary, 20 
N.Y.2d 309, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 229 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y.Ct.App. 
July 7, 1967). Vagrancy is a chronic condition rather than 
a moment of idleness or unemployment and under no accept-
able concept was committed by these appellants in the 
presence of the arresting officers. Indeed, the officers here 
testified that the first arrests were triggered by suspicion that 
a "con game" was in progress and thus it follows that the 
arrest of Watkins and James Green was but a tool of con-
venience to gain time for investigation and give purported 
validity to otherwise unlawful searches and seizures. Such 
use of vagrancy statutes, we think, has been properly criticized. 
See generally, Note, "Use of Vagrancy-type Laws for the 
Arrest and Detention of Suspicious Persons," 59 YALE L.J. 
1351 (1950); Foote, "Vagrancy-type Law and its Administra-
tion," 104 U. OF PA. L. REv. 603 (1956) [386 F.2d at 955-56. 
See also Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Wainwright v. 
New Orleans, decided June 17, 1968.]. 
The second trend is not as clearly established. Several recent 
cases suggest that at least some courts are employing a more 
lenient standard for establishing probable cause. Of course, the 
determination of probable cause is so closely related to the facts 
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of each case that any attempt at "matching" cases is usually 
fruitless. Nevertheless, decisions like that in Peters v. New York, 
reprinted infra Chapter 1 have been viewed by some as granting 
more leeway to the police determination than other recent 
decisions. See also People v. Evans, 141 N.W.2d 668 (Mich. 
Ct. App., 1966); Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir., 
1967). Compare Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
